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AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B, Chg 5                                                      6/13/2014


         Failure Condition   Suggested Verification    Possible Additional
           Categories     Method                Methods
             Minor        Analysis                    Flight Testing *3

             Major        Analysis                  Simulation
                       Ground Test                Flight Test
          Hazardous/      Analysis                  Simulation
         Severe-Major    Ground Test
                            Limited Flight Tests *1, *2
          Catastrophic     Analysis                  Limited Flight Tests *1, *2
                           Simulation
                       Ground Test

      * - Notes:

     1 - This should be determined on a case-to-case basis.

     2 - Minimize flight testing as a verification methodology, for this combination of
         provided integrity and failure condition category, due to safety in testing
          considerations. However, desirable flight testing may be feasible for some
         aspects if observing proper identification of flight test risk and assessments,
        and risk mitigations, in accordance with FAA Order 4040.26.

     3 - For analysis or verification, those probable failures evaluated as having minor
           effects, flight testing is an option if the effects are not obvious or if there can
          only be evaluation of closed loop effects in flight.

                            Figure AC 27 MG 17-1
                              Verification Methodology


             (ii) Due to AdFC inherent complexity, AdFC systems that typically have a large
number of test cases of single and multiple failures should be investigated to verify the
safety functions under all failure conditions.

           (A) Non-Real Time Computer Analysis. At the beginning of the development
process, when system components are not yet available in hardware, non-real time
computer simulation is a useful tool for supporting the preliminary system safety
assessment. This allows, at an early stage of the development, a prediction of the
effects and an assessment of the criticality of failure modes of the flight control system.
           (B) Pilot-in-the-Loop Simulator Test.  It may be practical to use a flight
simulator (FS) to qualitatively verify safety assessments for certain AdFC failure
conditions that would be high risk or unsafe to perform in flight. These assessments
may be part of the SA process used to show compliance with specific regulations. For


Page MG 17 - 4

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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