FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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6/13/2014                                      AC 27-1B, Chg 5


          (iv) Control Margin Awareness. Additional safety considerations are required to
address pilot awareness when employing AdFC systems since certain provisions of
§ 27.143 are not adequate for AdFC systems.

         (v) Flight Characteristics Compliance via the Handling Quantities Rating Method
(HQRM). Additional safety considerations are required to address a methodology for
compliance with § 27.1309 by using the HQRM to show an HQ rating of “satisfactory”
for flying qualities in degraded modes.

          (vi) Flightcrew Alerting. Additional safety considerations are required to
address the unique alerting characteristics of AdFC systems. The current regulations
may be inadequate to handle the display of possible degraded modes where a pilot
needs to be aware of the state of the primary flight controls.

           (vii) Data Integrity. Additional safety considerations are required to ensure that
the primary signals from the flight control system cannot be altered unintentionally, that
the altered signal characteristics will maintain stable gain and phase margins with
sufficient power to each axis, and that un-commanded signals are extremely
improbable.

            (viii) Flight Envelope Protection (FEP). Additional safety considerations are
required to ensure that an FEP system, if implemented, prevents the pilot or autopilot
from making control commands that would force the aircraft to exceed its structural or
aerodynamic operating limits.

      (2) Evaluation Methodology. There should be an evaluation of the AdFC system’s
performance, the same as with conventional flight control systems, to demonstrate
adherence to the safety requirements under all failure conditions. In each case, the
software and hardware used must be under configuration control to comply with the
regulations. We recognize the following evaluation methods; however, there may be
other acceptable methods:

           - Computer Analysis.
           - Pilot-in-the-Loop Simulator Test.
           - Bench Test.
           - Ground Test.
           - Flight Test.

            (i) There may be a relationship between the levels of integrity provided to satisfy
a determined failure condition category and the methodology used to validate the
adequacy of the provided integrity. The below table, Figure AC 27 MG 17-1, addresses
this relationship:




                                                       Page MG 17 - 3

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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