FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B, Chg 7                                                                       2/4/2016


acceptable when warning indicators in the cockpit are red. Additionally, NVIS-Red with orange hue is not
acceptable in cockpits with amber caution lights or indicators since they are similar in color. Interior
cabin, passenger, or emergency lighting should not interfere with NVG operations. Relying on a curtain
between the passenger compartment and cockpit may not be acceptable as the sole means of keeping
incompatible light from the cockpit if there are incompatible lights in the passenger cabin. Modifying the
passenger cabin lighting with NVIS lighting would be recommended, due to the possibility of
unacceptable light leaks, hot spots, and glare. Additionally, should a passenger or crewmember move
the curtain, the glare and reflections could compromise pilot performance while using NVG.

         (7) Exterior lighting. External lighting systems should not adversely affect the performance of the
NVIS. The external lighting modifications must comply with §§ 27.1383 through 27.1401 and should use
the guidance in AC 20-74. Evaluate external lighting under probable terrain, illumination, and
environmental operating conditions. Non-NVIS position lights may cause unacceptable shadowing and
interference with NVG performance in dark areas where there is little or no cultural lighting. NVIS-friendly
position and anti-collision lights may be required. Landing lights and searchlights should be usable in the
visible light mode.  If a dual mode visible, IR landing, or searchlight is provided, the visible mode should
be the default mode to allow the crew to more easily transition to unaided flight in case of NVG failures.
The crew should be able to illuminate landing zones sufficiently to allow unaided landing or obstacle
identification and clearance in the event they need to transition to unaided operations.

         (8) Reflections and glare. There should be no glare or reflections that interfere with unaided or
NVG aided operations. Sources of reflection and glare could include aircraft interior surfaces (floor,
panels, etc.), equipment, seats, etc. There must be demonstrated compliance with §§ 27.773, and
27.1381 in the ground and flight test.

         (9) Controls.

                  (i) NVIS lighting controls should be readily identifiable and accessible.

                    (ii) NVIS control design should prevent the inadvertent selection of incompatible light sources
in the cockpit. Typically, the use of a guarded or locking switch that does not allow inadvertently pushing
of the switch to the incompatible light position is acceptable.  If there is a capability to select an NVIS
incompatible light source, the detrimental effects of incompatible light sources on the external view
through the NVG should be evaluated. Some aircraft displays will power-up or re-boot in an NVG
incompatible mode and require pilot action to select the NVG mode. This may be problematic should it
interrupt power to a display in flight, and thus any possible effect on NVG performance should be
evaluated.

                     (iii) NVIS lighting should have a dimming range consistent with aided and unaided operations.
Compliance with §§ 27.771(a), 27.773, 27.1301, 27.1309, and 27.1381 must be demonstrated to ensure
lighting balance does not unacceptably increase pilot concentration or fatigue. Lighting balance is
important to assist in under-the-NVG scan. Native aircraft lighting may not have sufficient balance control
to support NVG operations.

                (iv) Some installations incorporate master light switches to control special busses for the
lighting systems.  If providing this capability, it should be evaluated to ensure failure modes are not
introduced that will result in the illumination of incompatible light sources or loss of all required lighting.

              (v)  If IR lighting is installed in conjunction with the visible lighting systems required by §
27.1385, the design must ensure that the control for the IR system does not turn the visible lighting
system off when the IR system is activated.

        (10) NVIS power sources. Determine whether the electrical power source capacity is adequate
for the system installation under all foreseeable operating conditions including engine failure. Duplicate
systems should be powered from separate busses and, in some cases, from independent sources if
required by the airworthiness regulations (see §§ 27.1309 and 27.1351).


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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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