FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B, Chg 1                                                         2/12/03

                  (i)    Direct Evidence.

              (A) When the HUMS application is classified as Hazardous/Severe Major,
then direct evidence must be gathered. Examples of where this might be the most
appropriate method include maintenance tasks such as vibration checks for
imbalance/misalignment of high energy rotating equipment, fatigue life counting, or
going "on-condition" for flight critical assemblies.

              (B) Direct evidence is required for establishing that the HUMS application
is sensitive to and obeys predicted response rules for the damage type, giving
consistent alerts. This evidence may be gathered from several sources as follows:

               (1) Actual service experience on HUMS equipped aircraft,

               (2) "Seeded tests" (where the wear, defect, or deterioration is introduced,
allowed to develop, and the technique response verified), and

               (3) On- aircraft trials, investigating cause and effect (for example,
introducing degrees of imbalance and calibrating the techniques response).

             (C) Tests should be representative of the aircraft for which the credit is
being sought and of test conditions representing the flight regime that would prevail
when data is normally gathered (e.g., cruise).  It should be established that the evidence
gathered from on-aircraft ground trials or rig based seeded tests is valid in flight.

                   (ii)    Indirect Evidence.

              (A) When the HUMS application is classified as "Major" or lower, indirect
evidence may be gathered. Criteria for this approach includes a criticality determination
of Major or lower and either or both; application to "on-condition" maintenance actions,
and/or lowering the probability of undetected failures. Monitoring of a high number of
potential failure modes can collectively determine the probability of undetected failures.
Here, it may not be practicable to generate direct evidence for each failure.

              (B) Proven analytical methods may be combined with sound engineering
judgment to provide calculated/derived criteria; tests can be performed to validate these
criteria. Model based analytical methods for predicting damage progression (e.g., finite
element analysis and fracture mechanics) may allow for a validation by claiming
analogy with 'direct' evidence generated for other aircraft types or equipment. However,
to more fully validate this analogous data set, a degree of direct evidence for the actual
equipment being monitored is still likely to be necessary to prove similarity of
application. This might be achieved by performing an appropriate number of seeded
defect tests and, in effect, "sampling" the range of failure types contained.

NOTE: For both direct and indirect evidence, the whole system must be validated end­
to-end.


Page MG 15 - 14

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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