FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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2/12/03                                       AC 27-1B, Chg 1

•  Continued airworthiness (synthesis).

NOTE: Early notification to the regulatory Authority of the credit type and the proposed
method for validation is recommended.

         (1) Description of Application and Associated Credit.

                  (i)   There are many types of HUMS credits with different levels of
criticality. Some may be the introduction of new maintenance practices, in place of the
established maintenance practices, and others may be the introduction of additional
safeguards for safety where all standard practices are retained.

                   (ii)     It is important to fully evaluate and describe the proposed credit and
the worst effect on the rotorcraft should the application fail or malfunction. This
evaluation is needed to determine the system criticality, the system installation integrity
requirements, and the depth and scope of the credit validation effort.

         (2) Understanding the Physics Involved.

                  (i)   The mechanisms of failure and/or degradations associated with the
requested credit should be understood. This includes how a failure occurs and/or at
what rate the degradation progresses and a determination of the point where
intervention action is necessary. For some complex applications, this may include
supporting information from validated analytical tools such as finite element analysis
and fracture mechanics.

                   (ii)   These understandings should be used to determine the four important
characteristics of a HUMS application.

              (A) The technique to be used.

              (B) The appropriate alert limits, including trending where appropriate.

             (C) The appropriate intervention action.

             (D) How often to monitor to give optimum opportunity for the intervention
action to be effective.

                    (iii)   This should also recognize the different characteristics of the
failure/degradation and determine when trending or a step function is most appropriate.

         (3) Validation Methodology.  All HUMS applications should have their validation
process based on suitably representative physical data. This process may use direct or
indirect evidence, or a combination of the two, depending upon the credit type and the
criticality on the aircraft of any HUMS failure or malfunction.



                                                      Page MG 15 - 13

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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