Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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AC 27-1B, Chg 1 2/12/03
standard. This system determined level should be a result of the end-to-end criticality
assessment and, in general, the same as the airborne software. Use of mitigating
actions is dependent on constraints stated in paragraph f(1)(ii).
(E) Data Processing. Data processing equipment and software should
have the capacity to process the amount of data required. It should not introduce errors
or provide out of specification accuracy for any parameter. The speed of processing
should not be limited, by the hardware or software, to an unacceptable rate. The
acceptability of speed will depend on the amount of data to be processed and the
specified performance for HUMS data processing. The speed should be reasonable to
accomplish data processing in a reasonable time for the particular HUMS application.
Hazardous/Severe Major or Major criticality applications that contain COTS should be
part of a dedicated system or demonstrate adequate protection for the higher level
processing from anything else processed on the same equipment. Subject to a
favorable comparison to the required independent verification means, Minor criticality
applications need not be part of a dedicated system.
(F) Display and Peripheral Equipment. The display, for most cases, may
be a part of the processing equipment or closely interface with it. It must be compatible
with other parts of the system and provide a clear usable presentation.
(G) Data Communications. Network applications, modem interfaces, and
other system sharing and transmission features may be utilized for integrity levels
associated with Major and Minor criticality categories, provided that the independent
verification means covers the use of these features. Integrity levels associated with
Hazardous/Severe Major criticality categories may utilize these features only if sufficient
protection can be shown to assure that this level of integrity is maintained throughout
any foreseeable failure/malfunction or mistake in any associated application, in addition
to required independent verification means.
g. Credit Validation. HUMS applications for which credits are sought must be
validated. For each application, evidence shall be provided that the physics involved is
understood and therefore that the monitoring technique/algorithm/parameter, rejection
criteria, and associated intervention actions are well chosen. The designer of the
component/equipment to be monitored is the most logical choice for this determination.
However, in some cases the source can be from any organization as long as the
validation criteria herein can be satisfied. If changes are proposed to an approved
system, re-evaluation is required to ensure existing credit(s) are not invalidated. The
degree of effort will vary and depend on the application type, the credit sought, and the
consequences of failure or any other malfunction. The validation process would
generally need to include the following:
• Description of application and associated credit.
• Understanding of the physics involved.
• Validation methodology.
• Introduction to service.
Page MG 15 - 12
Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.
Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective
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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.
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