FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B, Chg 1                                                         2/12/03

is required to be performed as long as that certification requirement is not changed by a
subsequent re-certification. An example of a mitigating action is a pilot's comparison of
airborne HUMS data with aircraft instrument data.

         (8) Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS): This term defines equipment hardware
and software that is not qualified to aircraft standards. An example of COTS equipment
hardware and software is a personal computer (PC) and its operational software.

         (9) Independent Verification Means: An independent process to verify the
correct functionality of a HUMS application on a ground station that utilizes COTS. The
intent of independent verification is to gain some degree of confidence in the COTS
operational reliability.

NOTE: This process may be discontinued when sufficient confidence in the application
has been achieved.

        (10) Synthesis: The process of evaluating service history and any other
relevant data with the objective of validating and, if necessary, refining the performance
of an approved credit.

     e.  Certification Approach.

         (1) There are three basic aspects to Health Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS)
certification. Certification of HUMS must address all three. The three aspects are
installation, credit validation, and Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA). These
aspects are not totally independent and do have varying interactions with each other. A
method to address these aspects is provided by the approach herein. Installation
includes all the equipment needed for the end-to-end application that is associated with
acquiring, storing, processing, and displaying the HUMS application data, including
airborne and ground based equipment. Credit validation includes evidence of
effectiveness for the developed algorithms, acceptance limits, trend setting data, tests,
etc., and the demonstration methods employed. A plan is needed to ensure continued
airworthiness of those parts that could change with time or usage and includes the
methods used to ensure continued airworthiness.

         (2) The certification process should begin with the declared application intent,
and determination of the resultant criticality. This declared intent should consider
whether this application is for credit, that it adds to, replaces, or intervenes in
maintenance practices or flight operations. When the declared intent is for credit, the
end-to-end criticality for such an application should be determined and used as an input
to establish the integrity criteria.  If the declared intent is for non-credit, it may be
certified as long as it can be shown that the installation of the equipment will not result
in a hazard to the aircraft.

         (3) The end-to-end criticality can be determined by performing a Functional
Hazard Assessment (FHA). The integrity level is required to be equivalent to the


Page MG 15 - 4

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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