Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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9/17/2009 AC 27-1B, Chg 4
requirement (e.g., droop stop breakage or loss of directional control with skids) if
landings are conducted to a full stop with the engines cut off.
(iii) The intent of this rule is to demonstrate controlled touchdown
conditions and freedom from loss of control or apparent hazard to occupants when
landing with all engines failed. In these cases compliance can be demonstrated by
leaving throttles in the idle position and ensuring no power is delivered to the drive train.
Also, computer analysis may be used in conjunction with simulated in-flight checks to
give reasonable assurance that an actual safe touchdown can be accomplished.
Another method may be to make a power recovery after flare effectiveness of the
rotorcraft has been determined. Other methods may be considered if they lead to
reasonable assurance that descent can be arrested and forward speed controlled to
allow safe landing with no injury to occupants when landing on a prepared surface with
all engines failed. Regardless of the method(s) used to comply with this requirement,
careful planning and analyses are very important due to the potentially hazardous
aspects of power off simulation and landing of a multiengine rotorcraft totally without
power. The all-engine-inoperative landing test is ordinarily done in conjunction with
height velocity tests because ground and onboard instrumentation requirements are the
same for both tests.
(6) Prior to conducting these tests, the crew should be familiar with the
engine inoperative landing characteristics of the rotorcraft. The flight profile may
be entered in the same manner as a straight-in practice autorotation. It is
recommended that for safety reasons idle power be used if a “needle split” (no
engine power to the rotor) can be achieved. In some cases, a low engine idle
adjustment has been set to assure needle split is attained. In other cases a
temporary detent between idle and cutoff was used on the throttle. In a third
case the engine was actually shut down on sample runs to verify that the engine
power being delivered was not materially influencing landing capability or landing
distances. The flare is maintained as long as is reasonable to dissipate speed
and build RPM. Rotor RPM must stay within allowable limits. Aft center of
gravity is ordinarily critical due to visibility and flarability. Following the flare, the
rotorcraft is allowed to touch down in a landing attitude. Rotor RPM at
touchdown should be recorded and it must be within allowable structural limits.
AC 27.75A. § 27.75 (Amendment 27-44) Landing.
a. Explanation. Amendment 27-44 rewords § 27.75(a) by replacing the word
“glide” with “autorotation” and further clarifies that the one-engine-inoperative (OEI)
approach is to be performed from an established OEI approach. The OEI approach
should be made utilizing a normal helicopter approach angle of approximately 6° or
some other angle determined to be acceptable to the FAA/Authority and properly
referenced in the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM).
b. Procedures. The policy material pertaining to this section remains in effect with
the following changes and additions:
Page B -35
Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.
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