FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B, Chg 1                                                         2/12/03

installation requires a higher degree of qualification, commensurate to the criticality of
the most severe effect of the intervention action(s) on the rotorcraft.

         (2) HUMS typically consists of a variety of onboard sensors and data
acquisition systems. The acquired data may be processed onboard the rotorcraft or on
a ground station (or a combination of both) providing the means to measure against
defined criteria and generate instructions for the maintenance staff and/or flight crew for
intervention.

         (3) The certification of HUMS must address the complete process, from the
source of data to the intervention action. There are three basic aspects for certification
of HUMS applications: installation, credit validation, and Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness (ICA). These aspects are not totally independent and do have varying
interactions with each other.

     d.  Definitions.

         (1) END-TO-END: The term "end-to-end" as used in the text is intended to
address the boundaries of the Health Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) application
and the effect on the rotorcraft. As the term implies, the boundaries are the starting
point that corresponds with the airborne data acquisition to the result that is meaningful
in relation to the defined credit without further significant processing. In the case where
credit is sought, the result must arise from the controlled HUMS process containing the
three basic requirements for certification as follows:

                  (i)   Equipment installation/qualification (both airborne and ground),

                   (ii)   Credit validation activities, and

                    (iii)   Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) activities.

         (2) HUMS: Equipment, techniques, and/or procedures by which selected
incipient failure or degradation and/or selected aspects of service history can be
determined.

                  (i)    Health Monitoring System: Equipment, techniques, and/or procedures
by which selected incipient failure or degradation can be determined.

                   (ii)   Usage Monitoring System: Equipment, techniques, and/or procedures
by which selected aspects of service history can be determined.

         (3) Credit: To give approval to a HUMS application that adds to, replaces, or
intervenes in industry accepted maintenance practices or flight operations.





Page MG 15 - 2

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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