Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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AC 27-1B, Chg 1 2/12/03
in a variety of ways. One way would be to use dissimilar EDs between redundant
implementations. Some other approaches may involve architectures with monitors that
are dissimilar to the systems supplying the redundant functionality. Other hardware
potential common mode failures must also be considered, such as power supplies,
signal sources, and common Input/Output (I/Os) chips.
(B) The intent of system separation requirements is to minimize the
possibility of total system failure/malfunction as a result of internal system failures or
external influences. In some cases, system separation addresses systems that provide
similar information by dissimilar means. An example of this type of system separation is
the requirement for independence between the fuel quantity display system and the fuel
low indication. This is a case where increased integrity can be accepted in lieu of total
independence for small parts of an integrated system, depending on the extent of loss
of independence and the associated failure condition category. Concerns to be
addressed for system separation requirements are as follows:
(1) Internal concerns include common mode failures/malfunction that
could result in unacceptable loss of satisfactory system functionality. Some of the
sources of these failures/malfunctions include common electrical power supplies,
common sensor sources, filtering referenced to common ground planes, common
processing, and common threats from Electro–Magnetic Interference (EMI) sources.
(2) EMI from internal sources (Electro–Magnetic Compatibility (EMC))
and external sources (High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)) must be addressed from
systems separation aspects. Unless complete system immunity to EMI can be shown
for designs of systems that provide functions to address catastrophic failures, the
design should preclude influence from EMI events. This is of particular concern when
redundancy is used to meet the criticality requirements. Designs should address the
possibility of EMI affecting the required function because of close physical proximity
between all or parts of the redundant sections of the system. Areas of design that have
the most concerns are those that include redundant system sections in the same
enclosure and the redundant sections have a common cavity for penetration of wiring
connectors. Another significant area of concern is for redundant system sections that
employ wiring cables with little physical separation between cables for the respective
redundant sections. In these cases, different lengths of cables between these
redundant sections would reduce the possibility that radiated EMI would affect the
system sections simultaneously at the same frequency.
(3) Other separation concerns are associated with external physical
installation aspects. These physical aspects include protection from fire, water,
excessive thermal variations, excessive vibration damage, and any mechanical failure
of another system/component that could possibly impair the integrated system’s
functionality and result in an unacceptable decrease in safety.
Page MG 13 - 6
Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.
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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.
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