Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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AC 27-1B, Chg 1 2/12/03
(7) Summary: Supporting systems should be considered an integral part of the
dependent system(s) that provides the required functions, for the purpose of addressing
design integrity requirements.
b. Complex System Integration
(1) Explanation. Complex integrated systems addressed by this paragraph are
those systems that provide more than one function from a single electronic device or
from more than one inter-related electronic devices/components. The inter-relationship
is based on common aspect(s) of providing the functions. The definition of complexity
as it applies to integrated systems, is a design condition that exhibits the characteristic
of possible combinations of simultaneous failures/faults, as opposed to simple systems
where there exists only failures/faults that can be considered individually. Integration
that results in providing several functions from one design source inherently increases
complexity, thus the two describing terms of “complex” and “integrated” are not
independent from one another. Computers have become more powerful with recent
increases in technology. Also, related sensors and servomechanisms have greatly
improved. This has created an atmosphere from which complex integrated systems
have spawned. Integrated systems can have the effects of reduced weight, economic
advantages, and system enhancements. However, with these advantages there are
some concerns that must be addressed, as this concept inherently creates problems
with showing compliance to system independence requirements.
(2) Procedure.
(i) Integrated Systems typically compromise the concept of
independence for failures/malfunctions and system/function separation. Using this as a
given, the approach for showing compliance for systems that have a requirement for
independence is to provide elevated system integrity to make up for the loss of
independence. The requirements for independence are both direct and inferred. The
direct requirements are defined by requirements for system separation and for specific
systems. The inferred requirements for independence are those that inherently have
independence by their method of implementation until integration of dissimilar functions
by recent technology. They are inferred since past methods of implementation provided
independence and therefore no direct requirement was defined.
(ii) The elevated integrity typically consists of high software levels and
high system reliability that addresses the failure condition categories determined by a
Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA). This approach basically states that the
independence for failures and function separation is absent, but the probability is small
for loss or malfunction, and the software level will match the threat level identified by the
FHA. Provided the integrity is a reality, this approach works pretty well for the loss and
malfunction aspects. However, system separation requirements may not be satisfied as
easily, as they are mostly concerned with common mode failures from external sources.
Some common mode concerns are temperature, fire, water, EMI, and physical
mechanical threats.
Page MG 13 - 4
Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.
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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.
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