FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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2/12/03                                       AC 27-1B, Chg 1


limited to displays for dependent systems, since control systems could also be affected.
Integrity for fault considerations must be addressed for supporting systems in relation to
dependent systems when the dependent system’s provided functions are assessed at
criticality levels of Major, Hazardous/Severe-Major, or Catastrophic. These integrity and
fault considerations must address not only a particular dependent system, but also the
accumulative effect on other systems that the same supporting system’s malfunction
may affect. This may, in turn, affect the aircraft level functional hazard assessment
(FHA) as the supporting system could act as a common point for simultaneous failures
of more than one system. Additionally, the design of the supporting systems should
preclude single point failures/faults for systems that support dependent systems
functions assessed to have a criticality of Catastrophic.

         (6) Certification Approach. There are three basic parts to the supporting
systems concerns addressed herein and they are the inclusion of supporting systems in
the integrity determination process, the design considerations for supporting systems
relating to more than one system, and single point faults for the supporting systems
themselves.

                  (i)   A two-step procedure should be used to determine the adequate
integrity level for supporting systems. The first step is to determine the level of criticality
associated with loss/malfunction of all or any combination of the dependent system’s
functions and all combinations of other dependent system’s functions that require
support from the same supporting system. This can be achieved through the use of an
FHA and associated FTA's. The criticality category level determined from this
assessment must be a product of failure/malfunction possibilities for all of the involved
dependent/supporting systems combinations and the worst case operational
consideration for the function(s) provided by the dependent systems. The second step
is to determine whether the supporting system’s design integrity is sufficient to address
the determined criticality category. The design integrity should address
failures/malfunctions results of the dependent system(s), any combination of
failures/malfunctions due to effects on more than one dependent system, and single
point failures of the supporting system itself.

                   (ii)   Analyses may be used to meet the criteria outlined in the second step
above, for systems that support one or more dependent system functions whose loss or
malfunction is assessed to be Hazardous/Severe-Major orCatastrophic. Analyses, such
as a fault tree analysis, in combination with a common cause analysis to validate
assumptions regarding the independence of faults, should be performed to show
compliance. Testing may be required to validate the analysis, if the system is complex
or dynamic in nature.

NOTE: Showing high reliability for a single thread system is not sufficient to meet the
requirements for a Catastrophic failure condition category, thus reliability cannot be
used to substitute for the preclusion of single point failures/faults.



                                                       Page MG 13 - 3

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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