FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B, Chg 1                                                         2/12/03


                  (i)   Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) Paragraphs 27.1301, 27.1309,
27.1351, and 27.1435.

                   (ii)   Standards - Latest revision of RTCA/DO178 and RTCA/DO 160; Parts
of SAE documents ARP4754 and ARP4761.

         (4) History: Applications of recent technology for systems have, in many cases,
resulted in systems that are dependent on one or more supporting system(s) for inputs
such as power or signal sources of any type. This relationship creates concerns for
recognition that the criticality of the supporting system may be higher because of its role
of supporting a dependent system of high criticality. The example of Liquid Crystal
Displays (LCD) for engine instruments, in particular, has caused concern about the
integrity of the supporting electrical power system. Past designs for engine instruments
did not require electrical power for operation, but present designs with LCDs do require
electrical power. Additionally, engine instruments of those older helicopter designs
were driven from a mixture of sources such as independent wet line, pneumatic, and
electrical drive (Tach Generator) inputs, and thus had independent failure modes from
the sensor/power input aspect(s). This means that the integrity of the electrical power
supplied to the dependent system must be commensurate with the level of integrity as
required for the highest criticality engine instrument application(s). This also stimulates
the concern that the electrical power system can become a common point for failure of
all engine instruments simultaneously, as well as anything else powered by the
electrical system. For this example, these considerations represent an increase of
integrity requirements for the electrical power system over previous designs of electrical
systems for VFR helicopters. In the past, these electrical systems did not support
required functions of higher criticality and were allowed to be simple in design with low
design integrity and susceptible to single point faults. Application of recent technologies
for systems resulting in dependent systems that require supporting systems must
address the concerns for higher integrity and single point faults.

         (5) Discussion: Integrity of supporting systems must be sufficient to support the
required integrity of their associated dependent systems. The relationship of supporting
systems to dependent systems is similar to an analogy of them being links in a chain,
where the weakest link must be able to support the required integrity level that is
consistent with the associated criticality category assessment. This principle is not new,
but there may not be recognition that systems previously accepted at low integrity levels
may not be acceptable because of their new role as supporting system(s). New
emphasis must be applied to determine acceptability of previous designs that have
become supporting systems through application of new technology or changes of
system architecture. This is particularly true for derivative designs, or changes to
existing design by either supplemental type certificate (STC) or field approval, where
new technology system applications, or system architecture changes have been
applied, that created a dependent/supporting system relationship. The main concerns
are for systems such as electronic displays that are installed and supported by non-
upgraded systems, such as single source and/or low reliability power generation and
distribution systems. However the concerns related to supporting systems are not


Page MG 13 - 2

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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