FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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2/12/03                                        AC 27-1B, Chg 1

GAG cycles, once per maneuver cycles, and other high load cycle events should be
accounted for as the loads are combined with the established usage spectrum. The
service life of the component may then be determined using Miner’s linear cumulative
damage rule, considering both high and low cycle fatigue damage. The calculated
service life obtained for a total damage equal to one is then the maximum allowable
replacement time for the component.

        f.  Fail-Safe Evaluation.

         (1) General. The fail-safe evaluation of the flight structure is intended to ensure
that, should fatigue cracks initiate, the remaining structure will withstand service loads
without failure until the cracks are detected. The fail-safe evaluation generally
encompasses establishing the components which are fail-safe, defining the loading
conditions and extent of damage for which the structure is to be designed, conducting
structural tests and analysis to substantiate that the design objective has been
achieved, and establishing inspection programs to assure detection of fatigue damage.
Design features that may be used in attaining a fail-safe structure are:

                  (i)    Selection of materials and stress levels that provide a controlled slow
rate of crack propagation combined with high residual strength after initiation of cracks.

                   (ii)   Design to permit detection of cracks, including the use of crack
detection systems, before the cracks result in an appreciable loss of residual strength.

                    (iii)  Use of multi-path construction and the provision of crack stoppers to
limit the growth of cracks.

               (iv)  Use of composite duplicate structures so that a fatigue crack or failure
occurring in one element of the composite member will be confined to that element and
the remaining structure will still possess limit load-carrying ability.  It may be necessary
to employ the design techniques of f(ii) above to assure effectiveness of these features.

              (v)  Use of backup structure wherein one member carries the entire load,
with a second member available and capable of assuming the load if the primary
member fails.

         (2) Extent of Fail-Safe Damage. The extent of the partial failure is to be such
that it would be readily detectable during the specified inspection.  It may involve
complete failure of a principal element, failure of more than one element, or only a
partial failure of an element, depending on the rate of crack propagation, the ease of
detection, and the inspection interval. Damage in inaccessible areas should extend into
inspectable areas.

Typical examples of the fatigue damage that should be considered are outlined below:




                                           AC Page MG 11 - 13

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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