FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B                                                                  9/30/99

              (A) Structural integrity when subjected to:

               (1)  Air loads throughout the approved flight envelope with floats installed,

               (2) Water loads during water entry, and

               (3) Water loads after water entry at speeds likely to be experienced after
water impact.

              (B) Rotorcraft handling qualities throughout the approved flight envelope
with floats installed.

                   (ii)   Normally deflated. Emergency flotation systems which are normally
stowed in a deflated condition and inflated either in flight or after water contact during
an emergency water landing should be evaluated for:

              (A) Inflation.

               (1) Proper Inflation. The inflation system design should minimize the
probability of the floats not inflating properly or inflating asymmetrically. This may be
accomplished by use of a single inflation agent container or multiple container system
interconnected together. Redundant inflation activation systems will also normally be
required.  If the primary actuation system is electrical, a mechanical backup actuation
system will usually provide the necessary reliability. A secondary electrical actuation
system may also be acceptable if adequate electrical system independence and
reliability can be documented.

               (2) Inadvertent actuation. The inflation system should be safeguarded
against spontaneous or inadvertent actuation for all flight conditions.  It should be
demonstrated that float inflation at any flight condition within the approved operating
envelope will not result in a hazardous condition unless the safeguarding system can
be shown to be reliable. Limitations to the approved envelope can be established so
inadvertent actuation does not impose a hazard at the new envelope.

               (3) Float actuation. The float activation means may be fully automatic or
manual with a means to verify primary actuation system prior to each flight.  If manually
inflated, the float activation switch should be located on one of the primary flight
controls. These activation means should be safeguarded against spontaneous or
inadvertent actuation for all flight conditions.

               (4)  Flight Limitations. Maximum airspeeds for intentional in-flight
actuation of the float system and for flight with the floats inflated should be established
as limitations in the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) unless in-flight actuation is
prohibited by the RFM.




Page MG 10 - 2

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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