FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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9/30/99                                             AC 27-1B


         (3) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. Failure modes and effects analysis,
along with limited demonstration and suitable engine health monitoring procedures, may
provide the basis of an acceptable solution to possible unexpected power limiting due to
engine condition.  It should be shown in the analysis that there is no probable event or
combination of events which can cause a latent problem leading to inadequate fuel flow
at high powers. The analysis should include all components of the fuel system such as:
pump(s), control system (mechanical, hydromechanical, electronic, etc.) pipework,
filters, fuel nozzle(s), and electrical interfaces.  It should also address the probable
effects of accumulated running time, dirty fuel, and hostile environment.

         (4) High Corrected Gas Producer Speed.

                  (i)   The proposed OEI ratings will cause the engine to run at high
corrected gas producer speeds (Ng/ ). At high Ng , performance characteristics of
components, especially in the compressor, can change significantly and to an extent
which would change the extrapolation of low speed run line data.

                   (ii)    In operation, the effects of the accretion of dirt, FOD, component
deterioration, and erosion of blading may also cause changes in the high-speed
performance of an engine.

                    (iii)  The above effects must be considered when developing power
assurance procedures and data.

         (5) Special Devices.

                  (i)   The satisfactory operation of devices or systems whose functioning is
required in order to achieve the OEI powers should be verified. Devices or systems,
which in normal operations are not exercised through the range of travel needed to
achieve the OEI powers, may require special checks to assure adequate capability.

                   (ii)   Special devices that are required only in order to achieve the OEI
    powers (for example, solenoids to provide additional cooling flow to hot-section
    components or a water/anti-freeze mixture into the compressor), should be
     subjected to periodic checks and have a demonstrated high reliability.

        f.  Airframe Considerations.

         (1) Instrumentation Accuracy.

                  (i)   The accuracy of any power assurance check is strongly dependent on
the air data and engine parameters. SAE ARP 1217 (May 1979) provides guidance on
the desired measurement accuracy for parameters used for engine health and
diagnostic monitoring. The parameters to be considered with their respective functions
include:


                                                        Page MG 9 - 5

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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