FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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Original FAA AC 27-1B, PDF page 822
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AC 27-1B, Chg 2                                                           4/25/06

Medical Service (EMS) equipment, night sun lights, some air conditioners, video and
sound systems that require large currents (25 amps – up) to operate, Forward Looking
Infrared System (FLIRS), some forward looking radars, some weather radars, some
communication systems that transmit 30 watts or more, some data link transmission
systems, etc.

      NOTE: Equipment that does not meet this criteria is considered to
       be “equipment not known to have a high potential for interference.”

              (B) Class of Equipment – Equipment Not Known to Have a High
Potential for Interference: Once it has been established that the equipment being
proposed to be installed is not in the class of “equipment known to have a high potential
for interference,” per the criteria stated in paragraph (2)(ii)(A), there is no requirement to
conduct the EMI installation tests described in the “EMI Installation Testing for Critical
Controls/Installation Test Conditions” paragraph (2)(iii). However, the cross-matrix
operational checks for EMC considerations described in paragraph (2)(ii) are still
required.

                    (iii)  EMI Installation Testing for Critical Controls:

               (A)   EMI installation testing is no longer required for unqualified
equipment that does not have a high potential to cause interference. However, EMI
installation testing is the only method of testing to show compliance for interference
considerations, for the class of “equipment known to have a high potential for
interference.” The criteria for determining whether the “equipment is known to have a
high potential for interference” is stated in paragraph (2)(ii)(A).

              (B) To accomplish the EMI installation tests, there must be an FAA-
approved test plan that requires the high interference potential equipment to be
operated through all reasonable modes of operation, in order to determine if
electromagnetic interference is entering the electronic control system. EMI installation
testing consists of interrogating the control, if it has such a feature, to determine if the
critical electronic control system is adversely affected (identify the recorded faults that
occur during the test). Additionally, real-time monitoring of the control’s input/output
parameters should be accomplished. The pass/fail criteria is “no detected interference”
for a pass state, and conversely a fail state if any interference is detected entering the
control.  If interference is detected, the source of interference should be investigated to
determine if the detected interference is the worst case. In some cases, the detection of
interference may result in flight tests being required to determine if the interference is
worse in flight. After the worst case interference is defined, the interference must be
eliminated at the source, or the interference must be evaluated to assure that the critical
electronic controls, its functions, and its related indications do not result in an unsafe
condition. For FADECs, special test equipment developed by the engine manufacturer
will be required to interrogate and monitor the controls input/output parameters. Other
types critical controls may also require special test equipment to perform this type of
testing.


Page MG 4 - 12

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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