FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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Original FAA AC 27-1B, PDF page 820
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AC 27-1B, Chg 2                                                           4/25/06


                  (i)      If the applicant has access to the initial analysis used for the type
certification, one method to accomplish the new reliability analysis is by multiplying
the exposure time used in the original reliability analysis by the ratio of the increased
maximum endurance to the original maximum endurance. That is, if the aircraft
endurance increases by 50 percent due to additional fuel capacity, the assumed
exposure time should also increase by 50 percent. The applicant should then rework
the analysis using this new exposure time.

                   (ii)     If the applicant does not have access to the initial analysis it will be
incumbent upon them to provide the rationale used for determining the new exposure
time and to provide a complete analysis for the systems determined to be critical.
The FAA engineer should compare this new analysis to the original.

     d. CERTIFICATION GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE TO THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMC) TESTING FOR
NON-QUALIFIED EQUIPMENT AND EQUIPMENT KNOWN TO HAVE A HIGH
POTENTIAL FOR INTERFERENCE WHEN INSTALLED ON ROTORCRAFT WITH
ELECTRONIC CONTROLS THAT PROVIDE CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.

         (1) Background.

                  (i)    Rotorcraft operations are varied and use a wide assortment of
equipment. While some of this equipment is qualified to aircraft standards, particularly
environmental standards, some of the equipment not qualified to such standards may
be the source of harmful electromagnetic interference. Rotorcraft typically have not had
electronic controls that perform critical functions, such as engine controls and flight
controls; therefore, there was no real concern about requiring equipment to be qualified
to aircraft standards. Typically, this equipment was installed with only a cross-matrix
operational check for EMC. These tests consisted of operating the equipment in
question and checking visually for an indication of interference. The equipment was, for
the most part, non-required equipment and the primary concern was that interference
might be emitted from the equipment.

                   (ii)   Unqualified equipment and their effects on critical systems is of
particular concern due to the recent increase in the number of rotorcraft with electronic
engine controls and the implementation of fly-by-wire technology. Additionally, the
physical close proximity of installed equipment to electronic controls that provide critical
functions is inherent due to the smaller size of most rotorcraft and represents a greater
potential for interference than for larger fixed wing aircraft.

         (2) Requirements.

               (i) The rules to assure that required functions are not subject to interference
are provided in the certification basis for the rotorcraft. Although the certification basis
may differ between aircraft, the requirements that address electromagnetic interference


Page MG 4 - 10

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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1196 original pages. 0 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

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