FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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9/30/99                                             AC 27-1B

               (v) The anticipated operational action required as a result of detected
failures.

                 (vi) Possible operational results of the undetected failures.

                   (vii) Verification that the assumed worst case flight operation is the
worst case.

              (B) Manual Backup: Additional aircraft operational testing is required
to specifically evaluate the manual backup system for compliance with the FAR
requirements. The acceptability of the manual backup system depends substantially
on its installation and interface with the airframe. The following items need to be
demonstrated in accordance with § 27.927 and §27.939 or accomplished on each
application prior to the acceptance of the manual backup system:

               (1)  It should be demonstrated by flight test with the failure of the
primary engine control, that the aircraft can be flown and a safe and controlled
power-on landing executed without creating an undue pilot workload.

               (2)  It should be demonstrated by flight test that switching between
control modes will not create an unsafe condition during any phase of operation
within the aircraft operating envelope.

               (3) The pilot action required as a result of a failure of the primary
control and used as an assumption in the FHA and FMEA should be validated during
flight tests and listed in the emergency procedures section of the flight manual.

      c. FADEC RELIABILITY REVIEW DUE TO INCREASED ROTORCRAFT
ENDURANCE

         (1) Background. This advisory material is to provide guidance for
reevaluation of the FADEC control system reliability due to extension of the aircraft
mission endurance. During the initial type certification of an aircraft, an analysis is
normally conducted on systems to determine their criticality category (e.g.
catastrophic, hazardous, major, etc.) and reliability requirements. To establish a
system’s reliability, an exposure time is determined by making certain assumptions.
In most cases, the exposure time is the average endurance based on the various
flight scenarios in which the aircraft is to be used. When an aircraft’s expected
mission endurance is increased by adding fuel capacity, a new analysis for system
reliability should be conducted taking into account the new increased mission
endurance.

         (2) Requirements.





                                                        Page MG 4 - 9

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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