FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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Original FAA AC 27-1B, PDF page 818
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AC 27-1B                                                                  9/30/99

              (B) Criteria: Acceptance of an engine fitted with a single channel
FADEC system in a single engine rotorcraft application requires that the integrity
levels of the FADEC system be compliant with the criticality levels determined by the
aircraft level Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA). In addition, final acceptance of
the system at the aircraft level for the application is based on the integrity level(s) that
match the criticality level(s) determined by the hazard assessment that uses data that
has been validated during the aircraft flight test program. These
assumptions/prerequisites would include operational aspects associated with the
possible FADEC failures and would include as a minimum the following:

               (1) Crew/aerodynamic response to failure.

               (2) Worst case flight operation for failure to occur. (Landing, IFR, etc.)

               (3) Duration of flight operation (exposure time).

               (4) System interaction with shared Inputs/Outputs with other systems
and/or with back-up systems.

               (5) Adequate annunciation of failure.

                   (ii)   Validation Criteria:

              (A) General:

               (1) Validation of the assumptions/prerequisites made by the engine
manufacturer in developing the SSA, using aircraft level FHA requirements, must be
validated by conducting flight testing during the certification of the installation. The
possibility exists that if the assumptions cannot be validated during flight testing, then
engine and/or FADEC redesign may be required.

               (2) Failure management methods that are related to operational
characteristics should be addressed.  It should be determined that the FADEC/engine
manufacturer's envisioned failure management is desirable and compatible with the
operational requirements. Therefore, the following basic FADEC related information
should be identified:

                    (i)  The detected failures.

                      (ii) The failures that are not detected.

                       (iii) The action that the FADEC takes when failures are detected.

                 (iv) The failures that are annunciated to the crew and in what manner.




Page MG 4 - 8

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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