Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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9/30/99 AC 27-1B
provided. If pilot reset is to be allowed, the procedure should be described in the
RFM.
(viii) Calculated failure rate (with unannunciated faults present): Before
a calculation of the failure rate can be attempted, the failure should be defined. The
determination of failure rate, using the definition of failure, can be the product of a
Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) combined with a reliability analysis, using
individual part reliability figures. The figures should come from some recognized data
base. The failure rate calculations should consider the worst case application
limitations such as flight operation, environmental considerations, and time of
operation. The flight operations to be considered for the worst case scenario include
all flight segments (take off, cruise, hover, landing, etc.) together and separately for
the various missions the aircraft is expected to be used in. Another way to determine
failure rate is to use service history. However, service history is applicable only if a
high degree of similarity exists for the FADEC and its installed application. The
calculated failure rate is the direct result of the FMEA, and should meet the integrity
level requirement determined by the Functional Hazard Assessment.
(6) Certification Approach:
(i) Analysis Requirements: Functional Hazard Assessment:
Compliance to the requirements of FAR paragraphs 27.1141 and 27.1309 for a
single channel FADEC in a single engine application should be based on criticality of
application for the system under consideration. This criticality of application may be
determined by performing an aircraft level hazard assessment that starts with the
type of possible failures and ends with the results of these failures. The results can
be categorized into criticality levels and the required integrity levels can be obtained
by matching the required integrity level to the criticality level. The main emphasis
should be on determining the higher levels of criticality (Major and above) and their
source. This process should include consideration of failures seen at the operational
level and interaction of the failures with the airframe and crew as well as the system
itself. The following subject areas are related to this assessment.
(A) Assumptions: Assumptions should be made about the
airframe/crew interface in order to perform the aircraft level hazard assessment.
These assumptions are prerequisites to perform an aircraft level hazard assessment
and must be listed in this hazard assessment and validated by airframe testing when
the airframe is available. If the assumptions cannot be validated, the actual airframe
test data must be substituted for the invalidated assumptions (assumed
prerequisites) and the hazard assessment re-evaluated with the new data supported
prerequisites. The results of this new assessment would be the deciding factor for
acceptance of the FADEC system for the installation as designed or provide the
necessity for design changes.
Page MG 4 - 7
Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.
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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.
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