FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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Original FAA AC 27-1B, PDF page 816
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AC 27-1B                                                                  9/30/99

manufacturer’s required interval for testing the backup or alternate system should be
based on the expected failure rate established during the failure analysis of the
system. However, the pilot should have the capability to test the backup system at
the pilot’s discretion. Additionally, failure of the primary system must not affect the
safe operation of the backup or alternate system.

                    (iii)   Capability of back-up system: Section 27.1143 requires that each
power control provide a positive and immediately responsive means of controlling its
engine. Additionally, § 27.903 requires that the powerplant systems associated with
engine control systems are designed to give reasonable assurance that the engine
operating limitations will not be exceeded in service. Although back-up control may
be somewhat degraded, the system should allow for control of the engine and the
aircraft within their operating limits.  It should be demonstrated that upon failure of the
primary control the aircraft can continue to be operated safely and execute a
controlled power-on landing without creating an undue pilot workload. This includes
demonstration of the ability to maintain rotor speed within acceptable limits while
transitioning to the backup mode and while using the backup control.

               (iv)   Ability of crew to switch to back-up:  If crew action is required for
switching to the back-up mode, this ability must be demonstrated during all phases of
flight from any seat which may be occupied by the pilot in command or the copilot.
The process to be used by the pilot to switch to the back-up mode should be clearly
described in the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) as required by FAR paragraph
27.1581.

              (v)   Transfer to backup: The transfer to the back-up mode from the
primary control mode or an intermediate mode (fixed position) should occur without
excessive time delay or variation in power. Time delays and power variations
experienced during the transfer should be evaluated during flight test for
acceptability. A means should be provided to alert the pilot that transfer to the back­
up mode has occurred.

               (vi)   Annunciation: Adequate annunciations should be provided to cue
the crew of faults/failures and/or transfer of engine controls. These annunciations are
of visual and aural types and must be distinct as to purpose and should not be
misleading, especially under any fault/failure. Flight evaluation of these
annunciations is required before final acceptance can be made.

                (vii)  Automatic Transfer:  If the system is designed to accomplish
automatic transfer between control modes, the transfer should occur without
excessive variation in power and a means should be provided to alert the pilot that
transfer to the back-up mode has occurred. Multiple automatic transfers between
control modes may cause aircraft instability. A method to lockout the primary control
after its initial failure and automatic transfer to the backup should be




Page MG 4 - 6

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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1196 original pages. 0 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

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