FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

Start with the scope.

This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

The source, within reach.

Search within this AC, jump to a source page, or download the complete saved publication.

Download saved FAA PDF ↓

Read the source

The document, within reach.

FAA source document

PDF page 815

PDF page 815 of 1196

Enlarge original ↗

Original FAA page, including its printed amendment and change markings. Extracted words support search; text reflow has not been reviewed.

Original FAA AC 27-1B, PDF page 815
Extracted text for finding words

This extraction supports search. Read the original page for complete notation and layout.

9/30/99                                             AC 27-1B

provided by a less capable channel either by hydromechanical or electronic means,
usually for “get-home” purposes rather than for dispatchability.

         (3) References. FAR paragraphs 27.901, 27.903, 27.927, 27.939, 27.1141,
27.1143, 27.1309, 27.1581.

         (4) Related Documents.

                  (i)   Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) paragraphs 21.21, 27.1301,
33.28, 33.75

                   (ii)  FAA Advisory Circular AC 29-2C

                    (iii)  Standards - Latest revision of RTCA/DO-178 and RTCA/DO-160;
SAE documents

               (iv)  ARP4754 and ARP4761

         (5) Design Requirements for Compliance with FARs 27.901 and 27.1141
FAR paragraph 27.901(b)(1) requires that each component of the installation be
constructed, arranged and installed to ensure its continued safe operation between
normal inspections or overhauls. FAR paragraph 27.1141 requires that no single
failure or malfunction of the powerplant control system will jeopardize the safe
operation of the rotorcraft. For an engine with a single channel FADEC some form of
redundancy is needed to ensure the continued safe operation of the rotorcraft in the
event of a random complete failure. This redundant system must be accessible and
provide the pilot with the ability to perform a controlled power-on landing. In addition,
FAR paragraph 27.939(a) requires that turbine engine operating characteristics be
investigated in flight. Flight tests are required as noted below to demonstrate
compliance with the FAR requirements. The following paragraphs provide guidance
for meeting these general design requirements.

                  (i)   Redundancy: Because of the random nature of electrical/electronic
component failures, there is no assurance that the electronic system will operate
safely between established inspection periods. Therefore, some redundancy
technique should be applied to the electrical/electronic part of the FADEC system to
reduce the probability of losing the ability to land safely or continue safe flight. This
redundancy is usually provided by some form of backup system or alternate method
of control of the engine. The requirement for a backup system can be achieved with
a number of approaches that include a simple mechanical/hydromechanical system,
a simple electrical/electronic system that is not a completely redundant channel, or a
completely redundant system.

                   (ii)     Availability: A means must be provided either by system design or
operational procedures to ensure that the primary and the backup or alternate system
are available functionally to serve the intended purpose. The


                                                        Page MG 4 - 5

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

Explore the rotorcraft safety and certification approach →
Source edition and reading coverage

1196 original pages. 0 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 2dfac16a3644dc18997069cca78746c10726e4b70d3aba996fc87843ffe68a2b

This is a dated source copy. Automatic source acquisition is not yet scheduled.

Original FAA PDF ↗

Working through a certification question?

Bring the aircraft, the basis and the issue your team needs to resolve.

Discuss your programme →