FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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Original FAA AC 27-1B, PDF page 813
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9/30/99                                             AC 27-1B

             (D) System Separation. On multiengine applications, each system should
be separated from the other system to the maximum extent practical. Wiring should be
routed separately. Power should be taken from independent busses and grounds, and
system components should be independent of one another.

              (E) Periodic Checks. Where periodic checks are appropriate, they should
be made at reasonable intervals. This would normally range from preflight checks for
certain items of greater concern to a tie-in with normal aircraft maintenance intervals for
other items.  If a crew check is specified, it should be evaluated to ensure it is a
reasonable check.  If items to be checked are located in an area that can be covered by
interior upholstery, for example, a crew check would not be considered reasonable, and
further design considerations may be in order.

               (iv)  Powerplant Installation Considerations.

              (A) Paragraph AC 27 MG 3 cites certain Part 29 provisions as being
appropriate if engine isolation is claimed for a Part 27 rotorcraft. The guidance which
follows, in part, references two Part 29 general engine isolation rules, §§ 29.901(c) and
29.903(b)(2), which should be considered.

              (B) A demonstration of compliance with § 29.901(c) would generally
include a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) of the powerplant systems as
installed. When a FADEC is utilized, the analysis would consider the control’s failure
modes, the installed engine reaction, the affect on the aircraft, and the crew response to
the situation. Combinations of undetected failures should be considered. Engine
failures which may be escalated in severity by the FADEC’s response to the initial
failure should be analyzed. Potentially hazardous failures should be evaluated during
flight testing. The requirements of § 29.903(b)(2) and § 27.1309(b)(2)(i) should be
reviewed in determining acceptability of failures.

             (C) Section 29.903(b)(2), Category A engine isolation, is intended to
ensure that a failure will not prevent the continued safe operation of the remaining
engine(s) or require immediate action of the crew to ensure continued safe operation.
The FADEC’s of the individual engines should be independent. Where communication
between FADEC’s is required (for example, for torque sharing), care should be
exercised to ensure that failures which may occur will not result in a power loss to the
extent that total power available is less than would be available under OEI conditions.
The no-required immediate-crew-action provision would preclude credit for manually
selected or operated backup systems in meeting the § 29.903(b) rule. These
unrequired backup systems, which may offer the advantage of get-home multiengine
capability rather than forced OEI operation, would be evaluated on a no hazard basis.

             (D) Section 27.939, turbine engine operating characteristics, intends a
flight investigation to ensure that no adverse characteristics are present to a hazardous
degree during normal and emergency operation in the allowed flight envelope. The
evaluation should include assessment of the minimum FADEC system certification


                                                        Page MG 4 - 3

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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