Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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AC 27-1B 9/30/99
Assessment results, this will require the proposal to be reviewed and approved by both
the Engine Directorate and the Rotorcraft Directorate.
(B) RTCA/DO-178A may still be applicable for those FADECs that were
previously developed and approved under DO-178A and the applicant is proposing to
make changes to the FADEC software. However, if the applicant proposes to make
changes to a DO-178A approved FADEC, the determination on whether the changes
should be made under DO-178B or DO-178A will need to be made by the Engine
Directorate and Rotorcraft Directorate. When utilizing DO-178A, one might arrive at the
conclusion that the engine control, as a required function, is essential; therefore, level 2
software under DO-178A would be appropriate for the control functions. However, for
this level 2 category software, errors are presumed to exist and a software error in a full
authority control could result in simultaneous unacceptable malfunctions in all engines.
The provisions of § 27.1309(b) for the rotorcraft installations to be designed such that
no probable malfunction or failure would result in a hazard to the rotorcraft, and the
Part 29 engine isolation rule § 29.903(b) would generally preclude this level 2
classification.
(C) System designs which provide redundant distinctive software or an
alternate technology control which is automatically selected and meets all of the
minimum regulatory requirements would reduce the impact of software errors and may
allow the level 2; i.e., essential, software classification. At level 1, it is accepted that the
software is sufficiently error free that the software does not require further verification in
the installation evaluation.
(ii) Lightning Strike Protection. Paragraph AC 27.1309b(4) contains a
complete discussion of an acceptable method of demonstrating that the FADEC, as
installed, is adequately protected against the catastrophic effects of lightning.
(iii) Electrical Power System Considerations.
(A) Normal Operation. The system should be evaluated with all power
sources operating normally. If additional power source capability is being provided that
is above the minimum required for certification, a certain portion of the evaluation
should be conducted while operating in the minimum configuration.
(B) Malfunction Conditions. Beginning with the minimum configuration
that is required for certification, electrical power system malfunctions should be
introduced and the impact on continued FADEC operation determined.
(C) Circuit Protection Location. The circuit protective devices for the
FADEC should be located in the cockpit such that they can be readily reset or replaced
in flight. The operation of the FADEC system is considered to be essential to safety in
flight. Reference § 27.1357(d). The definition for “essential to safety in flight” is given in
AC 27.1357b(1)(i).
Page MG 4 - 2
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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.
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