Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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AC 27-1B, Chg 7 2/4/2016
system to be more accurate than the previously approved methods used to provide the
required exceedance data. If the data collected by the system require filtering prior to
use, it is equally acceptable to accomplish this filtering either as the data are being
acquired (airborne function) or when the data are analyzed (ground based function) and
used in the maintenance of the rotorcraft.
(iii) System Components.
(A) Hardware. The system hardware, including airborne electronic
hardware, operated under the control of the imbedded software should be shown to
comply with § 27.1301. Additionally, in showing compliance to § 27.1309(a), laboratory
testing to the appropriate portions of RTCA Document DO-160 (current version) should
be performed.
(B) Software. If the function of the monitor system depends on embedded
airborne software to determine all or part of its functioning, RTCA Document DO-178
(current version) is the recommended standard to be used for the approval of the
system software. A further discussion of the use of this document is included in section
27.1309 of this AC. Carefully consider the selection of the software level because
sometimes the initial system approval basis is on the system being a non-required
optional system. Further, if it shows that there is no dependence on the system
software to preclude a hazardous failure mode, then a low software level would be
acceptable. However, once initially certified, it is very difficult to qualify software to
higher levels of “quality.” Because of this, we recommend choosing the software at the
level consistent with the ultimate use for the planned system approval. If the system
approval is only to be as non-required optional equipment, then the choice of a low
level of software qualification may be appropriate. However, when gaining more
experience with the operation of the system, and ultimately planning to seek approval to
perform required functions, then initially obtain an appropriate higher level of software.
Note: Consider extensive service experience as a basis for level of criticality without
accomplishing RTCA Document DO-178 procedures.
(20) Rotorcraft Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS).
(i) General. There can be a division of HUMS into two major categories,
health monitoring systems and usage monitoring systems. The provisions of § 27.1301
are used to determine that the system performs its intended function. The provisions of
§ 27.1309(a) and (b) are used to look at the impact of environmental conditions and
malfunctions. There are no HUMS approvals to replace service life or other specific
physical limits but several systems are now in the process of seeking approval. We
consider health monitoring systems the serious applications of this technology, and it
will probably be some time before the necessary database to allow full reliance on this
technology is available. There have been numerous approvals of usage monitoring
systems as optional equipment, and a good example of this technology is a condition
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Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective
Start with the certification basis and the function.
Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.
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