FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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9/30/99                                             AC 27-1B

increase, the rotor system may exhibit an aerodynamic instability such as rotor weave,
rotorcraft vibration may increase substantially, and rotorcraft static or dynamic stability
may be adversely affected. Which, if any, of these adverse characteristics are exhibited
at high rotor tip Mach numbers is dependent on the design of each particular rotor
system. FAA/AUTHORITY experience with high advancing blade tip Mach number has
shown that different types of rotor systems (articulated, semi-rigid, rigid, etc.) have
various adverse characteristics. Therefore, it has been FAA/AUTHORITY policy to
establish VNE so that it is not more than 0.9 times the maximum speed substantiated for
advancing blade tip Mach number effects for the critical combination of altitude,
approved power-on rotor speed, and ambient temperature conditions. This policy was
incorporated as a specific regulatory requirement with Amendment 27-21 to § 27.1505.
High main rotor tip Mach numbers obtained power off at higher than normal main rotor
rotational speeds should not be used to establish the maximum power-on tip Mach
number VNE limit. In addition, since the onset of adverse conditions associated with
high tip Mach numbers can occur with little or no warning and amplify very rapidly, no
extrapolation of the maximum demonstrated main rotor tip Mach number VNE limitation
should be allowed.

                    (iii)  A maximum speed for use of power in excess of maximum continuous
power (MCP) should be established unless structural requirements have been
substantiated for the use of takeoff power (TOP) at the maximum approved VNE
airspeed. TOP is intended for use during takeoff and climb for not more than 5 minutes
at relatively low airspeeds. However, FAA/AUTHORITY experience has shown that
pilots will not hesitate to use TOP at much higher than best-rate-of-climb airspeeds
unless a specific limitation against TOP use above a specified airspeed is included in
the RFM. Structural and fatigue substantiations have not normally included loads
associated with the use of TOP at VNE; thus, a TOP airspeed limitation should be
established from the structural substantiation data to preclude the accumulation of
damaging rotor system and control mechanism loads through intentional use of the TOP
rating at high airspeeds.

               (iv)  A one-engine-inoperative (OEI) VNE is generally established through
flight test and is usually near the VH or VNE of the rotorcraft.  It is the highest speed at
which the failure of the remaining engine must be demonstrated. For rotorcraft with
more than two engines, the appropriate designation would be “one-engine-operating”
VNE and would be that speed at which the last remaining engine could be failed with
satisfactory handling qualities.  It is possible, although believed improbable, that a
rotorcraft with more than two engines could have different VNEs depending upon the
number of engines still operating.  It is recommended that the OEI VNE not be
significantly lower than the OEI best range airspeed. A multiengine rotorcraft may
require an OEI VNE if the handling qualities following the last remaining engine failure
are not satisfactory or if the rotor speed decays below the power-off transient limits at
the all-engine-operating VNE.





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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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