FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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2/12/03                                        AC 27-1B, Chg 1

         (4) Additional Considerations. The following are items to consider in an icing
certification program. They are not intended to be all-inclusive, and the possibility of
widely differing characteristics and critical areas among various rotorcraft in icing should
be considered.

                  (i)   The rotorcraft should be shown by analysis and confirmed by either
simulated or natural icing tests to be capable of holding for 30 minutes in the design
conditions of the continuous maximum icing envelope at the most critical weight, CG,
and altitude with a fully functional ice protection system.

                   (ii)  A single ice protection system and power source may be considered
acceptable provided that after any single failure of the ice protection system, the
rotorcraft can be shown by analysis and/or test to be capable of safe operation (no
hazard) for 15 minutes following failure recognition in the continuous icing envelope
used as the basis for certification within the same icing limits used for the 30-minute
hold criteria. During this 15-minute period the rotorcraft may exhibit degraded
characteristics. Pilot controllable operating limitations such as airspeed may be used to
satisfy this continued safe flight criteria. For purposes of determining performance and
handling qualities degradation, ice protection system failure need not be considered to
occur simultaneously with engine failure unless ice protection system operation is
dependent upon engine operation.

                    (iii)   Although current airborne weather radar technology systems may be
useful in avoiding potential icing conditions by detecting precipitation, the use of
weather radar is not an FAA/AUTHORITY requirement for icing certification.

               (iv)   Section 27.1419(e) says there must be a means to advise the crew
when the rotorcraft is in icing conditions in order that the system may be activated.

              (v)  No autorotational performance data is required for rotorcraft which
have Category A powerplant installations. The rotorcraft must be capable of full
autorotational landings with the ice protection system operating (§ 27.143a(2)(vi).
Autorotational entry, steady state, and flare entry flying qualities and performance
should be evaluated with the ice load to be expected with the deice system operating
and with the ice load to be expected 15 minutes after failure of the system. Since the
en route performance can vary as the ice protection system operates, a mean value of
cyclic torque is acceptable provided, at no time the power required drops below that
required for level flight. The rotorcraft is assumed to be clear of ice prior to takeoff, and,
therefore, the takeoff performance is not degraded. The landing performance can be
based on the in-flight assessment of overall performance degradation. Items such as
fuel burns can be used as part of the in-flight performance degradation determination.
Regardless of the methods used to determine performance degradation, they must be
easily used by the crew. The hover performance should be addressed for the
termination of a flight after an icing encounter. The engines should be protected from
the adverse effects of ice. When ice does accumulate on the inlets, screens, etc., it



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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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