FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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2/12/03                                        AC 27-1B, Chg 1

                             (ii)  The assurance that the amount of ice accreted can be safely
eliminated by the ice protection system.

                              (iii)  An advisory system should not be overly sensitive and enunciate
frequent changes from “on” to “off” and thereby induce the pilot to ignore detector
indications. However, the system must be sensitive enough to readily detect sudden
exposure to icing conditions throughout the complete approved icing envelope.

                   (4)    If overheat of structure (such as engine inlet cowl or rotorblade)
can result from the anti-ice/de-ice systems being “on” during any operations, then a
means should be provided to alert the flight crew or an automatic means included that
will prevent such a condition.

                   (5)  The operation of an anti-ice/de-ice system should be examined
for the combined effect of an undetected failure of the annunciation system together
with a time delay before the flight crew manually activates these systems. Specific
considerations that warrant investigation include:

                            (i)  The amount of ice that can be accreted on critical areas.

                             (ii)  The effect of the ice shedding on the aircraft and propulsion
system.

                              (iii)  The capability of the anti-ice/de-ice systems.

                   (6)  The RFM should address the following:

                           (i)   Normal operational use of the IIDSS and any limitations.

                             (ii)  Procedures to use in case of disagreement between the dual ice
detectors, if applicable.

                              (iii)  Failure mode indications, and appropriate crew procedures.

                   (7)  An IIDSS must meet the applicable requirements of
FAR 27.1309. Multiple systems, automatic fault monitoring, Built-in Test Equipment
(BITE), pre-flight status tests, etc., may be used to support the design reliability,
depending on IIDSS system hazard analysis.

                   (8)  To ensure the continued airworthiness of IIDSS, it will be
necessary to develop maintenance procedures.

                   (F)  Compliance with the regulations may be demonstrated by tests,
analyses, models, similarity with approved systems, or a combination thereof as
outlined in the compliance plan and approved by the Authority.



                                                       Page F - 85

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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