Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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9/30/99 AC 27-1B
(iii) The effects of ice can vary considerably from rotorcraft to rotorcraft.
Experience gained for a rotor system with an identical blade profile could provide
valuable information but should be used cautiously when applied to another rotorcraft.
Assumptions cannot necessarily be made based on icing test results from another
rotorcraft. Particular care should be exercised when drawing from fixed-wing icing
experience as the widely different and varying conditions seen by the rotor blades make
many comparisons with fixed-wing results invalid. Likewise, icing effects on rotor
blades vary significantly from those on other parts of the rotorcraft. This is due to
changing blade velocity as compared with the constant velocity of the remaining parts.
(2) Reference Material. Prior to commencement of efforts to design and certify
a rotorcraft, the references listed in paragraph d should be reviewed. FAA Technical
Report ADS-4, Engineering Summary of Airframe Icing Technical Data,
December 1963, although somewhat dated, is recommended for basic aircraft icing
protection system design information.
(3) Objective. The objective of icing certification is to verify that throughout the
approved envelope, the rotorcraft can operate safely in icing conditions expected to be
encountered in service (i.e., Appendix C of Part 29 or the altitude-limited icing envelope
presented herein). This will entail determining that no icing limitations exist or defining
what the limitations are, as well as establishing the adequacy of the ice warning means
(or system) and the ice protection system. A limiting condition may manifest itself in
one of several areas such as handling qualities, performance, autorotation, asymmetric
shedding from the rotors, visibility through the windshield, etc. Prior to flight tests in
icing conditions, sufficient analyses should have been conducted to determine the
design points for the particular item of the rotorcraft being analyzed (windshield, engine
inlet, rotor blades, etc.). After the analyses are reviewed and found adequate, tests
should be conducted to confirm that the analyses are valid and that the rotorcraft can
operate safely in any supercooled cloud icing condition defined by Part 29, Appendix C,
or the altitude-limited icing envelope. Sufficient flight tests should be conducted to
assure adequate ice protection exists for the requested certification. References d(1)
and (3) may be useful in determining the design points and extrapolation of test data to
the desired design points.
(4) Planning. For best utilization of both the applicant’s and the
FAA/AUTHORITY’s resources, the applicant should submit a certification plan at the
start of the design and development effort. The certification plan should describe all
efforts intended to lead to certification and should include the following basic
information:
(i) Rotorcraft and systems description.
(ii) Ice protection systems description.
(iii) Certification checklist.
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