FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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 6/23/23                                        AC 27-1B, Chg 9


                 (J) The energy storage system installation approval should consider the
adequacy of associated interface components that may affect system performance.
Components necessary to interface with the energy storage system to provide
functionality should be shown to perform their intended function for the installation
environment and operations. These components should be qualified to meet the most
severe environment of the installation and operate properly within all specified limits.
Operational limits should be set for all energy storage system parameters identified as
critical for safely performing the intended function. The intended function of energy
storage system and knowledge of the charging function supplied by the rotorcraft are
major design considerations. The type of charging function may be a major factor in
determining the required design assurance level. If the energy storage system is not
adequately charged, the capacity may not be available, when required, to meet
emergency power demands. Overcharging has been shown to result in a thermal
runaway with certain battery chemistries. Monitoring and control functions may be
required to prevent safety critical parameters from exceeding specified limits. Such
critical parameters may include charging currents, fault currents, temperature, or
pressure.


                 (iii) Batteries are widely used as energy storage devices and utilize different
chemistries that may affect their performance. For the purpose of this guidance, a
battery or battery system is referred to as a battery.

Battery chemistries in widespread use today are lead acid, nickel cadmium, and lithium.
Each type exhibits different failure modes. These batteries also come in a wide range of
sizes and energy density. Large batteries are used for engine starting and as systems’
backup power in the event all electrical generation capacity is lost. Smaller batteries are
used in many electrical components independent of the aircraft power generation and
distribution systems. Some of these batteries are non-rechargeable and some are
recharged by an electrical generation system. The hazard analysis should take into
account the failure modes, the intended function, and the supporting rotorcraft interface.

             (iv) A significant design issue associated with batteries is internal impedance.
Low internal impedance usually characterizes batteries capable of high discharge rates.
Starting and fault clearing requirements are typically best satisfied by batteries with low
internal impedance. The other extreme is batteries with high internal impedances that
are generally more economical and perform low rate, long-time interval discharges well.
These types of batteries can provide the emergency power for equipment efficiently. If
both starting/fault clearing and emergency power requirements are to be provided using
a single battery, a workable compromise on the internal impedance should be
accomplished.

            (v) Lead acid batteries have been used in aircraft for many years. As such,
the failure modes are well documented. These batteries contain corrosive materials,
and consideration should be given to protect rotorcraft structures and systems from
inadvertent leakage. Hazardous gases may also be released under certain conditions;



                             Page F - 62.5

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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