FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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                                              AC 27-1B, Chg 9
6/23/23


              (iv) Fault Tree or Dependence Diagram Analysis. This is a structured,
 deductive, top-down analysis that is used to identify the conditions, failures, and events
 that would cause each defined Failure Condition. It is a graphical method of identifying
 the logical relationship between each particular Failure Condition and the primary
element or component failures, other events, or combinations thereof that can cause it.
A failure modes and effects analysis may be used as the source document for those
 primary failures or other events.

            (v) Markov Analysis. A Markov model (chain) represents various system
 states and the relationships among them. The states can be either operational or
 non­operational. The transitions from one state to another are a function of the failure
and repair rates. Markov analysis can be used as a replacement for fault tree and
dependence diagram analysis, but it often leads to a more complex representation,
 especially when the system has many states. It is recommended that Markov analysis
be used when fault tree or dependence diagrams are not easily usable, namely to take
 into account complex transition states of systems that are difficult to represent and
 handle with classical fault tree or dependence diagram analysis.

              (vi) Common Cause Analysis (CCA). The acceptance of adequate probability
 of Failure Conditions is often derived from the assessment of multiple systems based on
 the assumption that failures are independent. Therefore, it is necessary to recognize
 that such independence may not exist in the practical sense and specific studies are
necessary to ensure that independence can either be assured or deemed acceptable.
CCA identifies common causes for Failure Conditions. Once identified, the source of the
common cause is either eliminated from the design, the common cause or the system
 design is made to be tolerant of the related fault or malfunction, or the common cause
 or system design combination is found to be acceptable due to the failure or malfunction
 condition category it represents. The potential for failures or malfunctions due to
common causes is inherent in designs that provide multiple functions reliant on common
hardware or common software. This is also true for systems that produce related
 functions and share a common installation area. The installation area may represent a
 threat from several sources such as Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI), mechanical
 hazards, and environmental influences. The Common Cause Analysis is sub-divided
 into three areas of study:


           (A) Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA). This analysis has the objective of ensuring
 that the equipment installations within each zone of the rotorcraft are at an adequate
 safety standard with respect to design and installation standards, interference between
 systems, and maintenance errors. The ZSA examines the physical zone of the rotorcraft
 in which the system under consideration is installed to ensure that the surrounding
equipment or appliance installations do not compromise the system independence
 requirements. Mechanical failures that might generate fragments that could damage the



                           Page F - 30.13

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Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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