FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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6/23/23                                             AC 27-1B, Chg 9


       (5) Assessment Methods. Various methods for assessing the causes, severity,
and probability of Failure Conditions are available to support experienced engineering
and operational judgment. Some of these methods are structured. The various types of
analysis are based on either inductive or deductive approaches. Probability
assessments may be qualitative or quantitative. Descriptions of some types of analysis
are provided below and in SAE ARP4761.

               (i) Design Appraisal. This is a qualitative appraisal of the integrity and safety
of the system design.

                (ii) Installation Appraisal. This is a qualitative appraisal of the integrity and
safety of the installation. Any deviations from normal, industry-accepted installation
practices such as clearances or tolerances should be evaluated, especially when
appraising modifications made after entry into service. Hazards introduced by the
installation of the system should also be evaluated.

                 (iii) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA).


              (A) This is a structured, inductive, bottom-up analysis, which is used to
evaluate the effects on the system and the rotorcraft of each possible element or
component failure. When properly formatted, it will aid in identifying latent failures and
the possible causes of each failure mode. SAE ARP4761 provides methodology and
detailed guidelines that may be used to perform this type of analysis. An FMEA could be
a piece part FMEA or a functional FMEA. For modern microcircuit based line
replaceable units (LRUs) and systems, an exhaustive piece part FMEA may not be
practically feasible given current technology. In that context, an FMEA may be more
functional than piece part oriented. A functional oriented FMEA can lead to uncertainties
in the qualitative and quantitative aspects, which can be compensated for by more
conservative assessment, such as:


               1. Assuming all failure modes result in the Failure Conditions of interest,

               2. Carefully choosing system architecture, or

               3. Taking into account the experience lessons learned on the use of
similar technology.


              (B) Specific reliability numbers are not shown in § 27.1309. The
necessary degree of reliability is a function of the criticality of the system under
consideration. Acceptable sources of component failure rates include (1) military aircraft
component failure or fault reports or handbooks, such as MIL-HDBK-217C; (2) operator
or manufacturer component malfunction or defect records, such as airline component
defect records on sufficiently similar component designs; and (3) laboratory life tests.


                          Page F - 30.12

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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