FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

Start with the scope.

This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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6/23/23
                                             AC 27-1B, Chg 9


            (A) Define the system and its interfaces, and identify the functions that the
system is to perform. Determine whether or not the system is complex, similar to
systems used on other aircraft, or conventional. Where multiple systems and functions
are to be evaluated, consider the relationships between multiple safety assessments.

             (B) Identify and classify Failure Conditions. All relevant applicant-
 engineering organizations, such as systems, structures, propulsion, and flight test,
 should be involved in this process. This identification and classification may be done
 by conducting an FHA, which is a top-down assessment. The FHA starts at the
 rotorcraft operational level to identify possible hazards to the rotorcraft, its occupants,
 and flight crew. When establishing the hazard classification of a function, consider for
 example, the known loss of the function, the erroneous behavior or misleading
 information provided by the function, and degradation of the function as possible
 hazards. The hazards are classified using the five failure condition categories found in
 Figure AC 27.1309-2. The identified Failure Conditions are then evaluated with
 respect to the intended operations and combinations of operations for which
 certification of the rotorcraft is sought (e.g., VFR, IFR, CAT A, IFR plus CAT A). SAE
 ARP4761 provides guidance for determining when and under what conditions multiple
 failures should be considered.

            (C) If the system is complex, it is necessary to systematically postulate the
 effects on the safety of the aircraft and its occupants resulting from any possible
 failures, considered both individually and in combination with other failures or events.

            (D) Choose the means to be used to determine compliance with
 § 27.1309. The depth and scope of the analysis depends on the types of functions
 performed by the system, the severity of the associated Failure Conditions, and
 whether the system is complex (see Figure AC 27.1309-5). Once the Failure
 Conditions are determined to be Major Failure Conditions, experienced engineering
 and operational judgment, design and installation appraisals, and similarity
 consideration for previously installed systems may be acceptable. This may be
 sufficient in itself or in conjunction with qualitative analyses or selectively used
 quantitative analyses. For Catastrophic and Hazardous Conditions, a thorough safety
 assessment is necessary. The applicant should obtain early concurrence from the
 FAA on the choice of an acceptable means of compliance.

             (E) Include a description that establishes correctness and completeness
 and traces the work leading to the conclusions. This description should include the
 basis for the classification of each Failure Condition (e.g., analysis or ground, flight, or
 simulator tests). It should also include a description of precautions taken against
 common-cause failures, provide any data such as component failure rates and their
 sources and applicability, support any assumptions made, and identify any required
 flight crew or ground crew actions, including any Candidate Certification Maintenance
 Requirements (CCMRs), which are also referred to as Certification Check
 Requirements (CCRs). Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) are not the
 preferred method for showing compliance with the rules; therefore, they must be
 reviewed by the FAA for approval. Any CMRs must be included in the airworthiness


                          Page F - 30.8

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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