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6/23/23
AC 27-1B, Chg 9
(A) Define the system and its interfaces, and identify the functions that the
system is to perform. Determine whether or not the system is complex, similar to
systems used on other aircraft, or conventional. Where multiple systems and functions
are to be evaluated, consider the relationships between multiple safety assessments.
(B) Identify and classify Failure Conditions. All relevant applicant-
engineering organizations, such as systems, structures, propulsion, and flight test,
should be involved in this process. This identification and classification may be done
by conducting an FHA, which is a top-down assessment. The FHA starts at the
rotorcraft operational level to identify possible hazards to the rotorcraft, its occupants,
and flight crew. When establishing the hazard classification of a function, consider for
example, the known loss of the function, the erroneous behavior or misleading
information provided by the function, and degradation of the function as possible
hazards. The hazards are classified using the five failure condition categories found in
Figure AC 27.1309-2. The identified Failure Conditions are then evaluated with
respect to the intended operations and combinations of operations for which
certification of the rotorcraft is sought (e.g., VFR, IFR, CAT A, IFR plus CAT A). SAE
ARP4761 provides guidance for determining when and under what conditions multiple
failures should be considered.
(C) If the system is complex, it is necessary to systematically postulate the
effects on the safety of the aircraft and its occupants resulting from any possible
failures, considered both individually and in combination with other failures or events.
(D) Choose the means to be used to determine compliance with
§ 27.1309. The depth and scope of the analysis depends on the types of functions
performed by the system, the severity of the associated Failure Conditions, and
whether the system is complex (see Figure AC 27.1309-5). Once the Failure
Conditions are determined to be Major Failure Conditions, experienced engineering
and operational judgment, design and installation appraisals, and similarity
consideration for previously installed systems may be acceptable. This may be
sufficient in itself or in conjunction with qualitative analyses or selectively used
quantitative analyses. For Catastrophic and Hazardous Conditions, a thorough safety
assessment is necessary. The applicant should obtain early concurrence from the
FAA on the choice of an acceptable means of compliance.
(E) Include a description that establishes correctness and completeness
and traces the work leading to the conclusions. This description should include the
basis for the classification of each Failure Condition (e.g., analysis or ground, flight, or
simulator tests). It should also include a description of precautions taken against
common-cause failures, provide any data such as component failure rates and their
sources and applicability, support any assumptions made, and identify any required
flight crew or ground crew actions, including any Candidate Certification Maintenance
Requirements (CCMRs), which are also referred to as Certification Check
Requirements (CCRs). Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) are not the
preferred method for showing compliance with the rules; therefore, they must be
reviewed by the FAA for approval. Any CMRs must be included in the airworthiness
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