Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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AC 27-1B, Chg 96/23/23
(4) Safety Assessment Process Overview.
(i) When showing compliance with § 27.1309, the considerations covered
in this guidance should be addressed in a methodical and systematic manner. This
section of the AC is provided primarily for the use by applicants who are not familiar
with the various methods and procedures generally used in the industry to conduct
safety assessments. This section and Figures AC 27.1309-4 and AC 27.1309-5 are
not intended to be certification checklists, and they do not include all of the information
provided in this guidance. This section contains one method, but not the only method,
for showing compliance. The safety assessment process is a structured method of
general applicability for showing compliance with the regulation. Other methodologies
may be used to show compliance, but the safety assessment process is the only
structured process that is defined, and these defined objectives would be the logical
criteria applied to any other means of showing compliance. More detailed guidance
can be found in SAE ARP4761 on how to perform a safety assessment. SAE
ARP4754A, discussed in AC 20-174, includes additional information on how the safety
assessment process relates to the system development process.
(ii)The safety assessment process contains several parts that may be
necessary as a whole or in part, depending on the criticality or complexity of the
system under consideration. The rigor of assessment and analysis performed is also
dependent on the system criticality or complexity. At the extremes, some systems may
be simple enough such that the entire safety assessment can be performed by
observation and compliance shown by a simple statement. Complex and higher
criticality systems may require application of all of the safety assessment elements to
show compliance. Many states of varying complexity exist between these extremes
that may use less than the entire safety assessment process but require more than a
simple statement to show compliance. For purposes of the FHA, an autorotation is not
considered continued safe flight and landing.
(iii) Typical elements of the safety assessment process are as follows:
Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA)
Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA)
o Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
System Safety Assessment (SSA)
o Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
Common Cause Analysis (CCA)
o Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA)
o Particular Risk Assessment (PRA)
o Common Cause Analysis (CMA)
Page F - 30.7
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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.
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