FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

Start with the scope.

This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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                                             AC 27-1B, Chg 96/23/23

        (4) Safety Assessment Process Overview.


                  (i) When showing compliance with § 27.1309, the considerations covered
 in this guidance should be addressed in a methodical and systematic manner. This
 section of the AC is provided primarily for the use by applicants who are not familiar
 with the various methods and procedures generally used in the industry to conduct
 safety assessments. This section and Figures AC 27.1309-4 and AC 27.1309-5 are
 not intended to be certification checklists, and they do not include all of the information
 provided in this guidance. This section contains one method, but not the only method,
 for showing compliance. The safety assessment process is a structured method of
 general applicability for showing compliance with the regulation. Other methodologies
 may be used to show compliance, but the safety assessment process is the only
 structured process that is defined, and these defined objectives would be the logical
 criteria applied to any other means of showing compliance. More detailed guidance
 can be found in SAE ARP4761 on how to perform a safety assessment. SAE
 ARP4754A, discussed in AC 20-174, includes additional information on how the safety
 assessment process relates to the system development process.

             (ii)The safety assessment process contains several parts that may be
 necessary as a whole or in part, depending on the criticality or complexity of the
 system under consideration. The rigor of assessment and analysis performed is also
 dependent on the system criticality or complexity. At the extremes, some systems may
 be simple enough such that the entire safety assessment can be performed by
 observation and compliance shown by a simple statement. Complex and higher
 criticality systems may require application of all of the safety assessment elements to
 show compliance. Many states of varying complexity exist between these extremes
 that may use less than the entire safety assessment process but require more than a
 simple statement to show compliance. For purposes of the FHA, an autorotation is not
 considered continued safe flight and landing.

                    (iii) Typical elements of the safety assessment process are as follows:


                        Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA)
                        Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA)
                      o  Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
                        System Safety Assessment (SSA)
                      o  Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
                        Common Cause Analysis (CCA)
                      o  Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA)
                      o  Particular Risk Assessment (PRA)
                      o Common Cause Analysis (CMA)





                           Page F - 30.7

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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