FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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                                              AC 27-1B, Chg 9
6/23/23

                  (ii) PROBABLE. Probable events may be expected to occur on the order of
 between 10-3 to 10-5 times during the operational life of each rotorcraft.

                   (iii) REMOTE. Remote events are not expected to occur a few times during
 the total operational life of a random single rotorcraft of a particular type, but may occur
 several times during the total operational life of a number of rotorcraft of a particular
 type, that are based on a probability on the order of between 10-5 to 10-7.

              (iv) EXTREMELY REMOTE. Extremely remote events are not expected to
 occur during the total operational life of a random single rotorcraft of a particular type,
 but may occur a few times during the total operational life of all rotorcraft of a particular
 type, that are based on a probability on the order of between 10-7 to 10-9.

             (v) EXTREMELY IMPROBABLE. Extremely improbable events are so unlikely
 that they need not be considered to ever occur, unless engineering judgment would
 require their consideration. A probability on the order of 10-9 or less is assigned to this
 classification.


 Note: The five probability terms defined in paragraph c(1) above are intended to relate
 to an identified failure condition resulting from or contributed to by the improper
 operation or loss of a function or functions. These terms do not define the reliability of
 specific components or systems.


        (2) Definitions of Failure Condition Classifications. Failure Conditions may be
 classified according to the severity of their effects into one of the following categories
 (reference Figure AC 27.1309-2).


                 (i) NO EFFECT. Failure Conditions that would have no effect on safety. For
  example, Failure Conditions that would not affect the operational capability of the
  rotorcraft or increase crew workload; however, could result in an inconvenience to the
  occupants, excluding the flight crew.

                  (ii) MINOR. Failure Conditions that would not significantly reduce rotorcraft
  safety and that would involve crew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor
  Failure Conditions may include, for example, a slight reduction in safety margins or
  functional capabilities, a slight increase in crew workload, such as routine flight plan
  changes, or some physical discomfort to occupants.

                   (iii) MAJOR. Failure Conditions that would reduce the capability of the
  rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the
  extent that there would be, for example, a significant reduction in safety margins or
  functional capabilities, a significant increase in crew work load or in conditions
  impairing crew efficiency, physical distress to occupants, possibly including injuries, or
  physical discomfort to the flight crew.


                           Page F - 30.3

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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