Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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AC 27-1B, Chg 9
6/23/23
(ii) PROBABLE. Probable events may be expected to occur on the order of
between 10-3 to 10-5 times during the operational life of each rotorcraft.
(iii) REMOTE. Remote events are not expected to occur a few times during
the total operational life of a random single rotorcraft of a particular type, but may occur
several times during the total operational life of a number of rotorcraft of a particular
type, that are based on a probability on the order of between 10-5 to 10-7.
(iv) EXTREMELY REMOTE. Extremely remote events are not expected to
occur during the total operational life of a random single rotorcraft of a particular type,
but may occur a few times during the total operational life of all rotorcraft of a particular
type, that are based on a probability on the order of between 10-7 to 10-9.
(v) EXTREMELY IMPROBABLE. Extremely improbable events are so unlikely
that they need not be considered to ever occur, unless engineering judgment would
require their consideration. A probability on the order of 10-9 or less is assigned to this
classification.
Note: The five probability terms defined in paragraph c(1) above are intended to relate
to an identified failure condition resulting from or contributed to by the improper
operation or loss of a function or functions. These terms do not define the reliability of
specific components or systems.
(2) Definitions of Failure Condition Classifications. Failure Conditions may be
classified according to the severity of their effects into one of the following categories
(reference Figure AC 27.1309-2).
(i) NO EFFECT. Failure Conditions that would have no effect on safety. For
example, Failure Conditions that would not affect the operational capability of the
rotorcraft or increase crew workload; however, could result in an inconvenience to the
occupants, excluding the flight crew.
(ii) MINOR. Failure Conditions that would not significantly reduce rotorcraft
safety and that would involve crew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor
Failure Conditions may include, for example, a slight reduction in safety margins or
functional capabilities, a slight increase in crew workload, such as routine flight plan
changes, or some physical discomfort to occupants.
(iii) MAJOR. Failure Conditions that would reduce the capability of the
rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the
extent that there would be, for example, a significant reduction in safety margins or
functional capabilities, a significant increase in crew work load or in conditions
impairing crew efficiency, physical distress to occupants, possibly including injuries, or
physical discomfort to the flight crew.
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