FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

Start with the scope.

This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

The source, within reach.

Search within this AC, jump to a source page, or download the complete saved publication.

Download saved FAA PDF ↓

Read the source

The document, within reach.

FAA source document

Printed page F-28

PDF page 588 of 1196

Enlarge original ↗

Original FAA page, including its printed amendment and change markings. Extracted words support search; text reflow has not been reviewed.

Original FAA AC 27-1B, PDF page 588
AC 27-1B · F-28Open saved PDF here ↗
Extracted text for finding words

This extraction supports search. Read the original page for complete notation and layout.

AC 27-1B, Chg 4                                                     3/31/2014


expected to occur during the total operational life of a random single rotorcraft of a
particular type, but may occur during the total operational life of all rotorcraft of a
particular type that is based on a probability on the order of between 10-7 to 10-9 .

                   (5) EXTREMELY IMPROBABLE. (Remains the same for both the
three or the five classifications.) Extremely improbable events are so unlikely that they
need not be considered to ever occur, unless engineering judgment would require their
consideration. A probability on the order of 10-9 or less is assigned to this classification.

Notes:   If a quantitative analysis is used to help show compliance with regulations for
       equipment which is installed and required only for a specific operating condition
          for which the rotorcraft is thereby approved, credit may not be taken for the fact
         that the operating condition does not always exist. Except for this limitation,
        appropriate statistical randomness of environmental or operational conditions
      may be considered in the analysis. (However, the particular condition and
         probability of that condition should be agreed to with the FAA/AUTHORITY.)

       The five probability terms defined in paragraph d.(2)(ii)(B) above are intended
         to relate to an identified failure condition resulting from or contributed to by the
        improper operation or loss of a function or functions. These terms do not define
        the reliability of specific components or systems.

        Generally, the guidance for Failure Analysis of paragraph c. above, is not
        required in its entirety for non-IFR rated rotorcraft. The only failure or reliability
        requirement is that no single failure can result in a hazard to the rotorcraft. This
       can usually be accomplished by a systems safety assessment that may or may
         not, depending on complexity and configuration, require a numerical reliability
         analysis.

     e. Documentation.  All laboratory tests, ground tests, flight tests, and failure
analyses must be documented in sufficient detail to show compliance with § 27.1309
and included in the type design file. Section 21.31(a) provides the regulatory basis for
requiring this documentation.  If the applicant elects to use a numerical reliability and
probability analysis it must also be documented in sufficient detail.

        f. Software.

         (1) RTCA Document DO-178C, “Software Considerations in Airborne Systems
and Equipment Certification,” dated December 13, 2011, is the latest standard and is
recommended to be used for qualification and subsequent approval of airborne
software. See AC 20-115C for guidance on using DO-178C and earlier standards.
DO-178C defines five levels of software (i.e., levels A, B, C, D, and E). The level of
software is related to the criticality of the function that may be adversely affected by an
error in the software. The criticality categories are as follows:



Page F - 28

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

Explore the rotorcraft safety and certification approach →
Source edition and reading coverage

1196 original pages. 0 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 2dfac16a3644dc18997069cca78746c10726e4b70d3aba996fc87843ffe68a2b

This is a dated source copy. Automatic source acquisition is not yet scheduled.

Original FAA PDF ↗

Working through a certification question?

Bring the aircraft, the basis and the issue your team needs to resolve.

Discuss your programme →