FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B, Chg 4                                                     3/31/2014


         (2) Utilization systems that are required or critical as to performance of
intended function or result in rotorcraft hazard upon failure should also be analyzed for
failures by the procedures of paragraphs c(1)(i) through c(1)(iv) above. Examples of
systems that may be critical are autopilots, hydraulic control systems, navigation and
flight instruments on IFR-approved rotorcraft, and bleed air systems.

     d. Safety Assessment. The international safety community has contributed to
several documents providing guidance for conducting safety assessments for civil
airborne systems and equipment. "Safety assessment" is terminology commonly used
in the aerospace industry and addresses all aspects of fault, failure, or reliability
analysis. Depending on the complexity and assessed criticality of the systems or
equipment, the safety assessment can vary from a simple analysis which shows that
there are no catastrophic, hazardous or severe-major, or major failure conditions, to a
Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) with the various analyses that may be required.
Various analytical techniques may be used to assist the applicant and the
FAA/AUTHORITY in conducting the safety assessment for the determination of
compliance with the requirements. These analytical techniques are intended to
supplement but not replace engineering and operational judgment. A safety
assessment can be accomplished by several different methods. One method used in
past certifications (Failure Analyses) is addressed in paragraph c. above and is
acceptable for showing compliance. Another method is the safety assessment process
that contains the FHA addressed herein and is a methodology of general application to
show compliance for systems, and all or parts of it may be applied as necessary
depending on the complexity of design. The concept of safety assessment is provided
in SAE document ARP 4754A, " Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and
Systems," and that aspect of this document is endorsed as an acceptable way of
showing compliance to the requirements for function and design assurance. SAE
Document ARP 4761, “Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment
Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment,” can be used as a guide to perform
the different analyses that form the safety assessment. The starting point is a FHA that
identifies the assessed criticality of aircraft or systems functions. Further analysis is
directed to be performed on the identified sources of these functions (i.e., system(s) or
part of systems performing these function(s)). One of the most common directed
analysis is the reliability analysis.

         (1) Functional Hazard Assessment. The FHA is a top down assessment that,
on an aircraft level, starts at flight operations and identifies the criticality levels
associated with the malfunction or failure of functions. The source of these functions
can then be identified after completion of the FHA. There are five criticality levels
defined in paragraph f. below, as they pertain to part 27. These level definitions are
used in the FHA to decide which level matches the malfunctions or failures under
consideration. The bottom-up analysis is then directed to the identified function source.
Reliability analysis is the most common of the bottom-up analysis.

         (2) Reliability Analyses. Numerical Reliability Analyses may be developed, on
an optional basis, as a continuation of the failure analysis procedure.


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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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