FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

Start with the scope.

This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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3/31/2014                                      AC 27-1B, Chg 4


rotorcraft or the ability of the pilot to cope with adverse operating conditions, then the
crew must be alerted to this system degradation.

              (v) System Installation Considerations. In most cases, the installation of the
system components is a constituent part of the lightning protection. This is particularly
true in the use of shielding techniques.  If these installation features are required for
adequate lightning protection, consideration should be given to ensure that their
effectiveness is not derogated in service. ICAs must be provided to the parties who
service and operate the rotorcraft to allow them to take actions necessary to ensure the
continued effectiveness of the system lightning protection.

      c. Failure Analyses.

         (1) Power and distribution systems should be analyzed to show compliance
with § 27.1309.

                  (i) One acceptable procedure for documenting the analysis is contained in
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Fault/Failure Analysis Procedure ARP 926B,
revised June 1, 1997.

                   (ii) As a minimum, any analysis should consider the effect of failures of
components and systems on the capability of the rotorcraft to perform its intended
function without hazard.

                    (iii) The analysis should consider the indication of failure. Those latent
failures that occur without indication should be considered in all possible sequences and
combinations of additional failures until a positive indication of failure is provided.

               (iv) The analysis should consider failure of indirectly related parts of
installations which could induce failure in the system being analyzed; for example, the
effect of hydraulic fluid sprayed on electrical components as a result of a ruptured
hydraulic line. Another example is the result of a ruptured bleed air line and its effect on
hydraulic, fuel, or electrical lines or cables.

              (v) The Type Inspection Authorization (TIA) should call for specific
simulated failures, evaluation of failure detection, failure warning, and performance of
the remaining system on the ground and in flight to verify the critical aspects of the
failure analysis. The applicant should provide a proposed detailed test procedure for
incorporation in the TIA to accomplish this verification. The applicant’s proposed tests
simulating in-flight failures should be carefully reviewed by both the systems engineer
and flight test pilot to assure the flight test crew will not be subjected to hazardous flight.
Where practicable those simulated failures that would be hazardous in flight should be
evaluated by ground tests. Analyzed and tested systems (where functioning is
required) exhibiting hazards or failing to perform their intended functions under any
foreseeable operating conditions must be redesigned to comply with § 27.1309.



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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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