FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B, Chg 4                                                     3/31/2014


It is an acceptable procedure for the engine manufacturer, while he is obtaining his type
certificate, to accomplish this bench testing to determine the level of tolerance of the
FADEC system components to lightning encounter indirect effects. This approach has
the advantages that the bench tests are not necessarily required to be repeated when
the engine is installed in a different airframe. This recommendation is not meant to add
a requirement to the engine manufacturer but to propose a more efficient method of
certification.  If this tolerance was not determined by the engine manufacturer, the
applicant installing the FADEC in a rotorcraft would be expected to furnish this data.

                   (3) As with any analytical method, it is prudent to include a margin of
safety to account for the uncertainties involved in the analytical and testing processes.
Margins account for uncertainty in the compliance method. As confidence in the
compliance method increases, the margin can decrease. A factor of two is an
acceptable margin for systems with catastrophic failure conditions, if this margin is
verified by aircraft test or by analysis supported by aircraft tests. For other verification
methods, the margin should be approved by the cognizant certification office.

                   (4) When an analysis has no associated full-scale vehicle testing to
confirm the analysis, the analysis should be very rigorous. Additionally, it should be
expected in this situation that this analysis indicates a very large margin of protection.
Many factors must be considered in determining what constitutes an acceptably large
margin. The specific additional margin required should be based on an assessment of
the inherent uncertainty of a given analysis.

              (E) Pass or Fail Criteria. The certification plan should address a pass or
fail criteria for the testing and analysis to be performed. The following items should be
satisfied to assure acceptable system performance:

                   (1) No immediate crew action must be required.

                   (2) Automatic control of the engine cannot be lost for any appreciable
period of time. The engine must not be allowed to be out of control for a period of time
which will result in a hazard in a worst-case flight condition. Obviously, any rapid,
uncontrolled divergence is not acceptable.

                   (3) No crew action should be required to reset the system. This is not
to imply that the system cannot be designed with a manual reset, but the manual reset
cannot be used to show compliance to recover from a digital upset.

                   (4) The resumption of engine control after an upset must be
reasonably within the range which existed before the upset.

                   (5) No critical data can be lost.

                   (6) After the system recovers, if the performance of the system has
been degraded in a noncritical manner which would reduce the capability of the


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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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