FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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3/31/2014                                      AC 27-1B, Chg 4


not exist for all lightning strike encounters due to the fact that the rotorcraft may be
airborne with little or no airspeed.

              (B) Establish the Lightning Environment. Establish the components of the
total lightning event to be considered. These are the currents and voltages which are
described in the definition of the environment.

             (C) Full-Level, Complete Vehicle Testing. In accordance with traditional
FAA/AUTHORITY policy, the demonstration that the FADEC installed in a complete
type design rotorcraft will continue to operate properly when exposed to a worst-case
lightning strike is sufficient to demonstrate compliance with § 27.1309(a). Because of
the difficulties involved in utilizing this type of an approach, it is generally not used.

             (D) Analytical Processes. A description should be given in the certification
plan of the analytical process and certification tests to be utilized to demonstrate
protection effectiveness. Typically, the certification plan will include a combination of
analysis and tests. (Analytical techniques are most often utilized to predict the levels of
lightning-induced transients in interconnecting wiring.) In most cases, successful
analyses are based upon well-defined geometrical or electrical parameters such as
structural dimensions and materials resistivity. When electrical characteristics of
structural materials are not well established, development tests are often utilized to
obtain this data which is subsequently utilized in an analysis. In more complex
structures or electrical and electronic system installations, it is sometimes difficult or
impossible to define the problem in terms that can be analyzed. In these cases,
development or verification testing is often relied upon. The purpose of the certification
plan is to show how developmental tests, analyses, and verification tests are combined
to demonstrate protection design adequacy. In certain cases, previously verified
designs can be incorporated and their adequacy confirmed by reference to previous
verifications. Such reference should also be incorporated in the certification plan.

                   (1) The verification testing should be conducted on a system which
simulates as closely as possible the installed configuration. As few items as possible of
actual hardware should be simulated.

                   (2) Unless the applicant has opted to follow the guidance in
AC 20-136B as a means of showing compliance with § 27.1309(d), then the following or
other acceptable guidance should be followed. The use of various analytical processes
usually requires that the system component tolerance is established. The SAE AE4L
Committee Report No. AE4L-81-2 is one example of an acceptable reference to be
used for the testing accomplished to determine these tolerances. The testing which is
performed to determine the tolerance level of the control computer should include a
consideration for the occurrence of a non-recoverable digital upset. One method to
provide this consideration is to have the unit powered and the processor operating
normally under software control (usually this should be the exact software for which
approval is sought) when the test is performed.  If strike testing is used, then several
shots should be made to develop enough data to provide a reasonable confidence level.


                                                          Page F - 23

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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