FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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3/31/2014                                      AC 27-1B, Chg 4


electrical transient, ceases proper operation in accordance with its embedded software
while suffering no apparent component or device damage.

              (B) Since elements of electrical and electronic engine subsystems are
typically spread throughout much of the rotorcraft, transients caused by lightning are
coupled into the subsystem interface cables and may damage the system or cause
upset. Effective lightning protection must be designed and incorporated into these
systems. Reliance upon redundancy as a means of protection against lightning effects
is generally not adequate because lightning electromagnetic fields and structural IR
voltages usually interact (to some extent) with all electrical wiring aboard a rotorcraft.

             (C) The testing and analysis outlined in this discussion are methods by
which the FAA/AUTHORITY may be assured that when the rotorcraft experiences “the
foreseeable operating condition” of a worst-case lightning strike encounter that the
electronically controlled engines will continue to “perform their intended function” and
therefore be in compliance with § 27.1309 as installed.

             (D) The definition of what constitutes a full authority engine control is not
at this time clearly defined. However, it has been accepted in past certification that any
control which relies upon the electronics for the function on which Civil Certification or
Military Qualification is based (e.g., rotor speed governing) is a full authority control,
regardless of the backup control mode provided.  If engine certification or qualification
can be achieved without the electronic control which is subsequently added to achieve
improved operational efficiency in the aircraft, the control is “supervisory.” However, if
the controls used in a multiengine rotorcraft have a common failure caused by a
lightning strike which could result in simultaneous failures which would cause a
reduction in power greater than the loss of one engine, this would also be considered
“full authority.”

Note:     If OEI ratings are approved, cumulative loss of power from all engines must be
         limited to allow flight manual performance based on OEI ratings.

                   (ii) Procedures. Although not a regulatory requirement, it is recommended
that a formal written certification plan be used to assure regulatory compliance. The
use of this plan is beneficial to both the applicant and the FAA/AUTHORITY because it
identifies and defines an acceptable resolution to the critical issues early in the
certification process. These are the usual steps to be followed when utilizing a
certification plan:

              (A) Prepare a certification plan that describes the analytical procedures
and the qualification tests to be utilized to demonstrate protection effectiveness. Test
plans should describe the rotorcraft and FADEC system to be utilized, test drawing(s)
as required, the method of installation that simulates the production installation, the
lightning zone(s) applicable, the lightning simulation method(s), test voltage or current
waveforms to be used, diagnostic methods, and the appropriate schedules and
location(s) of proposed test(s).


                                                          Page F - 21

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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