FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B, Chg 4                                                     3/31/2014


two is an acceptable margin for systems with catastrophic failure conditions, if this
margin is verified by aircraft test or by analysis supported by aircraft tests. For other
verification methods, the margin should be agreed upon by the cognizant certification
office.                      (

             (C) Flight and engine controls are examples of “critical” functions. With
these critical functions defined, an analysis and testing should be performed to show
compliance with § 27.1309(a) (i.e., equipment, systems, and installations performing
critical functions should be designed and installed to ensure they continue to perform
those intended functions subject to the conditions encountered in a worst-case lightning
strike). Section 27.610 contains some methods which may be utilized for less complex
mechanical systems; however, a great deal of difficulty will be experienced in trying to
use these criteria to demonstrate that a very complex avionic system complies with
§ 27.1309(a). These avionic systems usually only require protection from indirect
effects of lightning, and therefore a method such as that outlined in paragraph b.(4)
below is recommended. This method may be readily adapted to other avionic systems
performing critical functions. Also, this identifies an acceptable quantification of the
expected airborne environment. The next step involves expanding the fault/failure
analysis to determine what probable malfunctions or failures of the installed equipment
systems and installation may occur as a result of a lightning strike to the rotorcraft. For
a twin-engine rotorcraft, these systems must be designed such that a failure or
malfunction will not cause a hazard to the rotorcraft. For a single-engine rotorcraft,
these equipment systems and installation should be designed to minimize hazardous
effects of failures or malfunctions. Note that the analysis which determines what are
probable malfunctions or failures should consider that the encounter with a worst-case
lightning strike is a given event.

         (4) Lightning Strike Protection of Full Authority Digital Engine Controls
(FADEC).

                  (i) Explanation.

              (A) The following discussion is written specifically for FADEC with an
alternate technology backup fuel control installed on rotorcraft with part 27 category A
engine isolation. The requirement for increased consideration of lightning strike
encounter effects on avionic equipment and systems has been brought about by the
increased use of avionics to perform functions, the failure or malfunction of which could
result in a hazard to the rotorcraft. The susceptibility of current high technology avionic
systems is increased by the use of large scale integration, very large scale integration,
and complementary metallic oxide silicon technologies which exhibit a greatly reduced
tolerance to large amplitude, low energy electrical transients as compared to
conventional bipolar technology, and the reduced physical protection and
electromagnetic shielding afforded aircraft avionic systems by the advanced technology
composite airframe materials. Additionally, processor-based systems have the failure
phenomenon of digital upset. A digital upset occurs when a system, perturbed by an



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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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