FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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9/30/99                                             AC 27-1B


         (5) Certification Approach. A two step procedure should be used to determine
the adequate safety level for this type of system. The first step is to determine the level
of criticality associated with the total loss/malfunction of these functions/indications or
loss/malfunction of the critical parts of the display. This can be achieved through the
use of a functional hazard assessment (FHA). This criticality assessment must be a
product of failure/malfunction of the indication system and the flight operation that would
represent the worst case for loss of this information. The second step is to determine
that the design integrity of the system is at least equal to the assessed criticality level
determined in step one.

         (6) Functional Hazard Assessment. The operational classifications to be
considered when assessing the criticality are Cat A, Cat B, and IFR. The need for
critical information varies with each of these different operational categories. An
example would be the demand for OEI parameter information in the single engine Cat A
operation. Another example is the loss of fuel quantity indication and fuel low level
indication simultaneously in IFR flight conditions. The FHA should address not only loss
of one type of indication, but combined loss of engine parameter indication, including
total loss of display information, caution/warning, fuel quantity indication, and any other
included display in combination with a particular flight operation. There are techniques
to lessen the consequences of the failure/malfunction requirements for integrity, such as
providing back-up displays for the information deemed critical for a particular
operational consideration.

         (7) Summary. The loss of all integrated display information for certain types of
flight operations may have the highest level of criticality associated with it. The same
may be true for malfunctions that result in misleading indications. These
failures/malfunctions must be addressed by the commensurate design integrity level.
Lesser levels of criticality must also be addressed by the appropriate design integrity
levels.





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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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