FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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AC 27-1B                                                                  9/30/99


      c.  Integrated Display Systems. This advisory material is to provide guidance for
compliance to Part 27 and Part 29 regulations as they apply to integrated display
systems. The integration aspects of these systems require some additional issues to be
addressed during certification. The term “must” in this advisory material is used in the
sense of ensuring the applicability of these particular methods of compliance when the
acceptable means of compliance described herein is used. This advisory material
establishes an acceptable means, but not the only means of certifying an integrated
display system.

         (1) Definitions.

                  (i)    Integrity. The term “integrity” for the purpose of this advisory material
includes the hardware quality requirements, including reliability; as well as the software
level requirements, as defined in DO178B.

                   (ii)    Criticality. The term “criticality” refers to the five levels of criticality
addressed in FAA Advisory Circulars AC 27-1B and AC 29-2C.

         (2) Related documents.

                  (i)   Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) paragraphs 21.21, 27.1301,
27.1309, 27.1305, and 27.1322

                   (ii)   Standards - Latest revision of RTCA/DO178 and RTCA/DO-160;

                    (iii)  SAE documents ARP4754 and ARP4761

         (3) Background. A tendency to integrate functions/indications that have
previously been independent is a result of technology advancement. Microprocessor
driven systems have facilitated the ease of this integration. Integrated Instrument
Display System (IIDS) or Engine Instrument and Caution Advisory System (EICAS) are
examples of integrated display systems. IIDS, EICAS, or any other similar systems are
defined as a combination of engine instruments ( previously independent indicators),
fuel quantity indication, and caution/warning parameters, as a minimum, presented by a
common display driven by a common processor.

         (4) Discussion. This design philosophy does not result in the traditional
requirement for individual display independence for failure/malfunction considerations.
This loss of independence means that a single failure could result in loss of most, if not
all, instrument displays on the integrated display system. Redundancy of the integrated
display system is often proposed to compensate for this lack of independence.
However, redundancy alone may not meet the integrity requirements since they are
derived from the level of criticality associated with the loss or malfunction of
instrument/parameter displays for flight operations that are dependent on these
indications.


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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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