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AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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3/31/2014                                      AC 27-1B, Chg 4


accretion on small surface areas (inlet screens). A review of this phenomena may be
found in National Research Council (Canada) Letter LT-92.

              (B) When this limited exposure concept is used, the aircraft type certificate
data sheet should clearly specify that the engine induction system must be reevaluated
if certification to the general ice protection regulation, § 27.1419, is requested. This
direct penetration and exit approach is inappropriate for aircraft for which full icing
clearance is requested (reference § 27.1419).

                    (iii) Engine induction system continuous icing protection would be necessary
for aircraft for which full-icing clearance is requested (reference § 27.1419(d)). The
approach is much preferred for all programs in order to reduce the scope of any
eventual total aircraft icing program effort and to increase the safety level in conducting
the rotorcraft natural icing tests. Since some rotorcraft have been FAA/AUTHORITY
certificated to operate in icing conditions, applicants may request full-icing clearance
and, as a result, must demonstrate that the engine induction system will operate in a
continuous icing environment.

               (iv) It is noted in section 29.1419 of AC 29-2C that some natural icing tests
are required to show compliance with the overall rotorcraft ice protection requirements.
It is not required that the engine induction system be evaluated as a part of that natural
icing test if adequate verification has been shown by tunnel testing, analysis, or other
means to assure satisfactory operation in an extended continuous icing environment.  If,
however, subsequent rotorcraft natural icing testing shows unanticipated detrimental
engine inlet effects, the inlet ice protection system should be reexamined.

              (v) The regulation specifies the examination of flight idling conditions. This
requirement is normally associated with a low-power letdown at the minimum practical
forward airspeed. Alternatively, evaluation of the minimum power and minimum
airspeed combination specified in the rotorcraft flight manual (RFM) for operation in
visible moisture when below 41°F (+5°C) will accomplish the intent of the idling
requirement.

               (vi) An acceptable approach to a finding of compliance would be a
combination of analysis of the performance of the ice protection system, which covers
the range of the applicable icing flight envelope (maximum altitude, minimum
temperature, etc., of the basic rotorcraft) supported and validated by tests. Ideally,
these tests would be conducted in natural atmospheric ice with special instrumentation
for droplet size and liquid water content. In practice, however, natural icing testing may
pose unacceptably severe problems since rotorcraft may not have the range and speed
to reasonably find icing clouds and may not be equipped with the airframe and rotor ice
protection needed for safety during the testing.

                (vii) Problems with analysis emerge if engine inlets incorporate screens,
turning vanes, sideward or upward openings, and edge or lip configurations, which
deviate from the airfoil shapes assumed in most of the analytical procedures described


                                                         Page E - 103

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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