FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

Start with the scope.

This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

The source, within reach.

Search within this AC, jump to a source page, or download the complete saved publication.

Download saved FAA PDF ↓

Read the source

The document, within reach.

FAA source document

Printed page E-65

PDF page 483 of 1196

Enlarge original ↗

Original FAA page, including its printed amendment and change markings. Extracted words support search; text reflow has not been reviewed.

Original FAA AC 27-1B, PDF page 483
AC 27-1B · E-65Open saved PDF here ↗
Extracted text for finding words

This extraction supports search. Read the original page for complete notation and layout.

9/30/99                                             AC 27-1B

when, in the critical flight attitude, evidence of system or engine malfunction occurs or,
in the case of transfer tanks, when flow to the receiving tank is interrupted.

     b. Procedures.

         (1) The unusable fuel for each tank can be determined by flight tests which
involve flight in the critical stable attitude and during maneuvers until indication of a
malfunction. Maneuvers should be conducted to be critical or conservative with respect
to unusable fuel. For boosted systems, the “first evidence of malfunction” may be a
pressure fluctuation to below the fuel pressure minimum redline, engine power
fluctuation, or boost pump failure warning indication. For suction lift systems, the
indication may be engine power interruption. Since an accurate measurement of the
remaining fuel in the tank should be obtained, a method to close off flow from that tank
would be needed. For transfer tanks, or tanks which are limited to use only during
cruise flight, the flight regimes usually can be limited to level flight at the CG condition
which, by inspection, would create the maximum unusable fuel. For tanks for general
use, the flight regimes should also include takeoff and landing using pitch attitudes to be
expected, as well as hover and level flight conditions. The possible adverse effects of
extreme lateral CG should be considered.

         (2) Normally, these tests are conducted with all equipment (pumps, ejectors,
etc.) operating as prescribed by the design. However, values for unusable fuel with
pump failures, if significantly different, should also be determined and listed in the flight
manual. The value for unusable fuel to be considered in the empty weight of the aircraft
should be that value determined with the pump(s) operating normally; i.e., pump failure
need not be considered.

      c. While the procedures of paragraph (b)(1) are acceptable, fuel exhaustion
during critical flight test conditions must be expected. To minimize this possible flight
test hazard, the applicant may, in many cases, utilize analysis and/or ground tests
involving normally available flight test data on aircraft attitudes, tank configuration
studies, and critical flight condition studies to determine unusable fuel. Any
questionable results, however, should be resolved by actual flight test or introduction of
conservatism into the finding.

AC 27.961.  § 27.961 FUEL SYSTEM HOT WEATHER OPERATION.

     a. Explanation.

         (1) Section 27.961 specifies that a hot fuel test be conducted on suction lift
systems, and on other fuel systems conducive to vapor formation, to ensure that the
system is free from vapor lock at a fuel temperature of 110° F under critical operating
conditions.

         (2) Pressure boosted systems would not ordinarily require hot fuel tests unless-



                                                       Page E - 65

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

Explore the rotorcraft safety and certification approach →
Source edition and reading coverage

1196 original pages. 0 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 2dfac16a3644dc18997069cca78746c10726e4b70d3aba996fc87843ffe68a2b

This is a dated source copy. Automatic source acquisition is not yet scheduled.

Original FAA PDF ↗

Working through a certification question?

Bring the aircraft, the basis and the issue your team needs to resolve.

Discuss your programme →