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AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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9/30/99                                             AC 27-1B

         (5) In § 27.953(b), the phrase “if a single fuel tank is used,” is intended to mean
if a single fuel tank is used to feed more than one engine. This interpretation is needed
in order to preclude, for example, a tri-engine design with two fuel tanks where two
engines draw fuel by independent means from one tank, but only one vent is provided
for that tank. This design would clearly violate the intent of § 27.953(b)(2) to assure that
two vents be supplied if fuel is drawn by more than one engine from a single tank.

         (6) If a single fuel tank is used to supply fuel to more than one engine:

                  (i)   There should be independent tank outlets for each engine, each
incorporating a shutoff valve at the tank. The phrase, “at the tank,” has rightfully been
interpreted to allow the firewall shutoff valve, which may actually be some distance from
the tank itself, to be used to show compliance with § 27.953(b)(1). Section 27.953(b)(1)
specifically allows the shutoff valve, if located at the tank, to serve as the firewall shutoff
valve provided the line between the valve and the engine compartment does not contain
a hazardous amount of fuel that can drain into the engine compartment.

                   (ii)   There should be at least two vents arranged to minimize the
probability of both vents becoming obstructed simultaneously. Typically, the means
used to prevent simultaneous obstruction is physical separation. The blockage or
malfunction of any vent should not jeopardize the continued safe operation of more than
one engine.

                    (iii)  The filler cap(s) for the tank should be designed to minimize the
probability of incorrect installation or in-flight loss. Usually, there should be only one
way to install and lock a fuel cap; if more than one way is possible, either method
should provide the positive sealing to avoid spillage. Minimizing the probability of
in-flight fuel loss would include the ability to visually determine that the cap is properly
installed and locked prior to flight.

               (iv)   Section 27.953(b)(4) simply clarifies that if a single tank is used to
feed more than one engine, the provisions for independent fuel feed systems
(reference § 27.953(a)) apply to the engines being fed from that tank.

AC 27.954.  § 27.954 (Amendment 27-23) FUEL SYSTEM LIGHTNING
          PROTECTION.

     a. Background. During the initial development and promulgation of the standards
concerning the airworthiness of rotorcraft, it was not deemed necessary to specify
design features that would protect the rotorcraft from the meteorological phenomenon of
lightning. This was due, in part, to the fact that rotorcraft were primarily operated in a
VFR and nonicing environment. Also, a prudent pilot avoided thunderstorms where the
possibility of encountering severe weather and a lightning strike was much greater. The
construction, design, and operating environment of civil rotorcraft have changed
markedly within the past two decades. Many rotorcraft are now authorized to fly IFR.
Additionally, many rotorcraft now use the same advanced technologies in structures and


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