Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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2/12/03 AC 27-1B, Chg 1
possible and still meet the other load criteria of this section. Typically this ratio should
not be less than 5. The following certification tests (reference MIL-STD-1290) or
equivalent should be conducted on each frangible or deformable attachment design.
(i) Static Tests. Each frangible or deformable device should be tested in
the three most likely anticipated modes of failure as defined in paragraph d(13). Test
loads should be applied at a constant rate not exceeding 20 inches per minute until
failure occurs.
(ii) Dynamic Tests. Each frangible or deformable attachment should be
tested under dynamic loading conditions. The attachment should be tested in the three
most likely failure modes as determined in paragraph d(13). The test load should be
applied in less than 0.005 second, and the velocity change experienced by the loading
jig should be 36 ±3 feet per second. It should be noted that the dynamic load pulse is a
ramp function starting at either previously determined failure load in 0.005 seconds.
The velocity change of the test jig 0 or some small test fixture preload and reaching the
is also a ramp function starting at 0 and reaching a final velocity of 36±3 ft./sec. in 0.005
seconds. These ramps functions simulate the dynamic conditions of a survivable
impact under which the frangible/deformable attachment must perform its intended
function.
(15) Section 27.952(d)(3) requires a frangible or locally deformable attachment
to meet the fatigue requirements of § 27.571 to eliminate premature fatigue failure. The
simplified method of AC 27 MG 11 may be used. Because of service history, all fatigue
sources (especially high cycle vibratory sources) should be reviewed. Fracture critical
materials should be avoided and ductile, damage tolerant materials utilized.
(16) Section 27.952(e) requires that, as far as practicable, fuel and fuel
containment devices be adequately separated from occupiable areas and potential
ignition sources. Several generic categories of ignition sources and potential
PCF-producing contact scenarios exist. The intent of the section is to define all possible
leak and ignition sources that could be activated in a survivable impact and to provide
design features to eliminate or minimize them such that the occurrence of PCF is
minimized and escape time is maximized. Adequate separation should be
accomplished by a thorough design review, potential PCF hazard analysis, and detailed
design trade studies. The resultant findings should be documented and approved. The
following PCF hazards and any other such hazards should be documented, minimized
by design to the maximum practicable extent, and their resolution documented and
FAA/AUTHORITY approved. Conditions to be reviewed should include, but are not
limited to, the following:
(i) High temperature ignition sources.
(A) Tank fillers or overboard fuel drains should not be located adjacent to
engine intakes or exhausts so that fuel vapors could be ingested and ignited.
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