FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

Start with the scope.

This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

The source, within reach.

Search within this AC, jump to a source page, or download the complete saved publication.

Download saved FAA PDF ↓

Read the source

The document, within reach.

FAA source document

Printed page E-38

PDF page 456 of 1196

Enlarge original ↗

Original FAA page, including its printed amendment and change markings. Extracted words support search; text reflow has not been reviewed.

Original FAA AC 27-1B, PDF page 456
AC 27-1B · E-38Open saved PDF here ↗
Extracted text for finding words

This extraction supports search. Read the original page for complete notation and layout.

AC 27-1B                                                                  9/30/99

loading of all four load factors. In some cases substantiation of the remaining three load
factors can be further simplified by a successful drop test if the fuel cell is symmetric
(i.e., structurally equivalent in all four directions).

         (3) Section 27.952(c) requires self-sealing breakaway fuel fittings at all fuel
tank-to-line connections, tank-to-tank interconnects, and other points (e.g., fuel lines
penetrating firewalls or bulkheads) where a reasonable probability (as determined by
engineering evaluation, service history, analysis, test or a combination) of
impact-induced hazardous relative motion exists that may cause fuel leakage to an
ignition source and create a PCF during a survivable impact. In some coupling
installations (such as fuel line-to-fuel tank connections), the tank coupling half should be
sufficiently recessed into the tank or otherwise protected so that hazardous relative
motion (of the fuel cell relative to its surroundings) following an impact-induced coupling
failure does not cause a tearout or deformation of the tank half of the separated
coupling that would release fuel. The only exceptions are either­

                  (i)    Installations that use equivalent devices such as extensible lines
(hoses with enough slack or stretch to absorb relative motion without leakage) or motion
absorbing fittings (rotational or linearly extensible joints); or

                   (ii)    Installations that conclusively show by a combination of experience,
tests, and analysis to have a probability of fuel loss to an ignition source in a survivable
crash of 1 x 10-9 or less.

         (4) Section 27.952(c)(1) specifies the basic design features required for
self-sealing breakaway couplings.

         (5) Section 27.952(c)(1)(i) defines the design load (strength) conditions
necessary to separate a breakaway coupling. These loads should be determined from
analysis and/or test, reference paragraph d(6). The minimum ultimate failure load
(strength) is the load that fails the weakest component in a fluid-carrying line based on
that component’s ultimate strength. This load comes from local deformation between
the coupling and its surrounding structure during a worst-case survivable impact. A
failure test of three specimens of the weakest component in each line that contains a
coupling should be conducted in the critical loading mode.  (If a single critical loading
mode cannot be clearly identified, each of the three most critical loading modes should
be tested.) The three specimen test results should be averaged. The average value is
then used to size the breakaway fuel coupling. [For standard specification (i.e., “off the
shelf”) hardware, equivalent testing may have already been accomplished and, if no
other mitigating circumstances in the design and installation exist, need not be
repeated.] To assure separation of the coupling prior to full line failure and to prevent
inadvertent actuation, the design load that separates the coupling should be between
25 and 50 percent of the minimum ultimate failure load (strength) of the line’s weakest
component. The critical loads should be compared to the normal service loads
calculated and measured at the coupling location to insure unintended service failures
do not occur. Typically this criterion is readily satisfied by the natural design because


Page E - 38

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

Explore the rotorcraft safety and certification approach →
Source edition and reading coverage

1196 original pages. 0 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 2dfac16a3644dc18997069cca78746c10726e4b70d3aba996fc87843ffe68a2b

This is a dated source copy. Automatic source acquisition is not yet scheduled.

Original FAA PDF ↗

Working through a certification question?

Bring the aircraft, the basis and the issue your team needs to resolve.

Discuss your programme →